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The Cambridge Analytica scandal, which unfolded in 2018, was a wake-up call for many and is a 
good illustration of political and civic consequences of big data in the digital age. In this thesis, I used 
theory-driven qualitative content analysis to explore political manipulation in the digital age, illustrated 
by the Cambridge Analytica scandal, and focus on how the democratic challenges, impugn the role of 
democratic citizens in the public sphere. For this matter I have used Habermas concepts of deliberative 
democracy, the public sphere, and citizen sovereignty extensively as a lens through which I analyse 
the events of 2018 and its aftermath. I was able to identify five challenges to the concept of the public 
sphere as it stands, and I relate my findings to how they may be consequential to the democratic system 
in general under a neoliberal capitalist order. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Our society is changing immensely. So much, that many argue we are undergoing the fourth industrial 
revolution. This new industrial paradigm, Industry 4.0, is at the core of many contemporary debates. 
Technological and cultural elements are the driving force of this paradigm shift to an industry, as well 
as society, 4.0, characterized mainly by digitalization; a digitalization that brings about a digital society, 
digital culture, and a heavy digital industry (Mazali, 2018). 
The various socio-technological problems that come with such a profound societal change are already 
at the heart of many academic debates and studies. In this master’s thesis I contribute to the 
endeavour to disentangle and understand one aspect of this change, which is altering life as we know 
it so strongly.  
A very pertinent case which illustrates the new challenges we are confronted with in the digital age of 
industry 4.0, is the Cambridge Analytica scandal. This scandal, which unfolded in March 2018, was a 
wake-up call for many, and revealed the hidden reality of digital networks, the business model of big 
data firms, and the importance of a new discussion on issues around privacy and civil sovereignty. 
Christopher Wylie, the Canadian whistleblower who worked with Cambridge Analytica, revealed how 
the British data analytics firm, that worked with Donald Trump’s election team and the winning Brexit 
campaign, harvested millions of Facebook profiles of US voters, in one of the tech giant’s biggest ever 
data breaches. The firm exploited Facebook and, through an external app, collected thousands of data 
points from millions of people. With the help of a psychologist at Cambridge University, test results 
from a personality test, derived from the app, were coupled with the illegally harvested Facebook data 
and was then used to build an algorithm that could analyse individual Facebook profiles and determine 
personality traits linked to voting behaviour. With this system, so-called swing-voters were targeted 
with highly personalised political advertisements (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018a), and hence 
likely effected the outcomes of both, Trump’s win in the presidential elections in 2016 as well as the 
success of the Vote-Leave camp in the UK’s Brexit referendum.  
The case is sociologically relevant from many perspectives: the scandal firstly tells the highly complex 
story of elections in the digital age. Political advertisement methods like the one used by the 
Cambridge Analytica firm commence a categorically new form of political manipulation, as I will show 
in this thesis, and has the potential to directly undermine democracy. The breach also discloses the 
unchecked power Facebook’s owner Mark Zuckerberg has over a quarter of the world’s population, 
by owning the monopoly that constitutes the biggest social network platform in the world. In this 
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thesis I want to investigate the political and civic consequences of such big-data scandals. Popular 
media rarely go beyond exploring big data as a hot, new topic and an exciting new tool, and rarely 
consider the issues of power related to it (Tufekci, 2014). It is here, I believe, where sociological 
research has both an opportunity as well as a responsibility, to pick up the zeitgeist and offer relevant 
insights for policy makers as well as academics and illuminate and clarify complex and novel problems 
in the digital age. 
On March 30th, 2018, just days after the scandal, Zuckerberg himself wrote an article in the 
Washington Post and called for stronger regulations and rules online (Zuckerberg, 2018). This is 
important because even though this scandal is clearly an illegal act of manipulation, and therefore 
(hopefully) a rare case, it sheds light on the possibilities and dangers of social networks at large. In 
combination with “normal” yet highly intransparent algorithms, filter-bubbles, fake news, and a post-
truth culture, the age of big data needs to undergo a cultural transformation in order to fit into our 
predominant value system, characterized by citizen sovereignty, freedom and democratic citizenship. 
I will explicate these new realities, as illustrated by the Cambridge Analytica scandal, by utilizing 
Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy and mainly drawing on the crucial concept of the public 
sphere. To do this, I will first look at the historical development of the concept of the public sphere 
over time and focus especially on citizens’ sovereignty as well as the role of the media. I will use an 
elaborated, modern version of this concept as a lens, to analyse what kind of changes this scandal is 
bringing about. In doing so, I will analyse several questions, the main ones being: (1) “Are the new 
forms of political manipulation, as exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica case, illustrating an entirely 
new form of manipulation via the media or is it merely larger in quantity?”, (2) “How do the democratic 
challenges in the digital age of 2019, as illustrated by CA, challenge the role of democratic citizens in 
the public sphere?” and (3) “What do these findings imply for real-life democracies?” In other words, 
in this thesis, my main aim is to find out how the democratic challenges in the digital age, illustrated 
by the Cambridge Analytica case, impugn the role of democratic citizens in the public sphere.  
To get to the roots of this I will first show how political manipulation has changed over time, and in 
what way the Cambridge Analytica case, as an illustration of severe political manipulation, stands out 
as a new phenomenon. For this reason, I tackle the problem in a chapter which looks at the historical 
development of political manipulation. After that I will move on to the analysis of my second research 
question. This will be done after having laid out the trajectory of Habermas original concept of the 
public sphere from the 1960s until today and using it as a research tool in order to understand the 
democratic challenges the Cambridge Analytica scandal reveals. I will then ponder on the implications 
of my findings for democratic systems as they stand today and touch upon the third question in my 
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discussion section, even though I do not aim to answer this question fully, but rather open up the 
implications my findings could have on a broader, more empirical, level. 
The approach in my thesis is theory-driven and my setting leans heavily on Habermas’ theories. I relate 
Habermasian concepts to an empirical case in contemporary social reality. I chose this approach, 
because there has been rather little conceptual theory-building about the political and civic 
consequences of big data (Tufekci, 2014), a research gap I would like to address with this work. 
Therefore, this work constitutes an empirically-based, conceptually sensitive, theory-driven setting 
that addresses the consequences of a newly emergent complexity of problems in politics in the 
digital age. I hope that I was able to do both in this thesis and offer some interesting insights into a 
new phenomenon of sociological interest and high relevance. 
 
2. Methods and Data 
 
To present my case, I will use the original Cambridge Analytica newspaper articles published in the 
Guardian as my data. This collection of 93 articles is openly accessible on the website of the Guardian. 
The Guardian has a business model which relies 100% on readership-funding, meaning that it does 
not employ any form of advertisement, and is neither influenced by billionaire owners, politicians or 
any shareholders. This also means that there are no paywalls or any other restrictions on the website, 
so the files are freely and unlimitedly accessible. I chose to use these news pieces as the data for my 
case, as the Guardian was the paper where the data breach was originally published, after a year-long 
investigation of the case and close collaboration with the whistleblower Christopher Whiley. For this 
thesis, I want to show that the Cambridge Analytica breach is a case illustrative of a relevant current 
social and political phenomenon and analyse the role of citizens in the practices of representative 
democracy against relevant theories.  
As a methodology to analyse this data, I have chosen content analysis, as it is a flexible and appropriate 
method for analysing text data. This analytic method struck me as appropriate for my research, as it 
is a way of reducing textual data, making sense of it and of deriving meaning (Given, 2008). Content 
analysis is a method for making valid inferences from texts, to the contexts of their use, and is thus 
able to provide new insights on the topic studied through this inference (Krippendorf, 2004). 
In this thesis, I am not interested in distinct frames, discourses or narratives used in the Cambridge 
Analytica articles, but rather in what the case represents and tells about social reality. I want to use 
the case as an illustrative example to depict a shift in citizens’ roles, responsibilities, and accountability 
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in democracy, via the concept of the public sphere. To be able to show this, I want to investigate the 
Cambridge Analytica case, and its influence on our political reality, with a relatively heavy focus on 
theories. More precisely, I will be using Habermas’ theorizations on deliberative democracy, with a 
special focus on his conception of the public sphere as a theoretical lens for this thesis. In doing so, I 
am placing the theory at the beginning of my work and will use it as an a priori framework to guide 
my research questions. This is a deductive, theory-driven approach to my analytical procedure (Potter 
& Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). This form of qualitative content analysis of my data will enable me to 
understand and analyse the content or contextual meaning of the text. Content analysis is a widely 
used methodological tool to describe a phenomenon in textual data. In my case, especially a directed 
(theoretical) approach to qualitative content analysis makes sense, because of my strong focus in 
Habermas’ theories. In this approach to content analysis, existing theory or prior research exists about 
a phenomenon that would benefit from further investigation (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The goal of a 
directed, theoretical approach to content analysis is often to validate or extend conceptually a 
theoretical framework or theory. My intention, however, is not to “test” Habermasian theories with 
my case, to see if the theory holds or needs to be refined somehow. Instead of using deliberative 
democracy and a refined, updated version of the original conception of the public sphere, as an 
adequate theory about today’s world, I see it as an ideal conceptualization of democracy against which 
I can analyze relevant events of today.  
Qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting words to examining language intensely, for 
the sole purpose of classifying large amounts of text into a few categories that represent certain 
meanings, narratives, or discourses (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Instead, the goal of content analysis is 
“to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study” (Downe-Wamboldt, 
1992, p. 314, cited from Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Based on my research aim and my interest in the 
realist (versus constructivist) meaning of the Cambridge Analytica scandal for our democracy, the 
analysis of my data will not entail counting of words, as it is often done in qualitative analysis. This is 
also because my aim it not to offer supporting and non-supporting evidence for the theory, hence I 
do not find it necessary to present evidence in the form of codes or the like, as it is usually common 
in the deductive, theory-driven, approach to content analysis (Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 1999). 
Counting words or coding would not serve my initial research aim in any way and the frequency of 
certain words is simply irrelevant when interested in the social reality of a recent phenomenon, the 
anatomy of the public sphere and current trends relating to the ideals of (deliberative) democracy. In 
practice this means that my analysis will entail the extraction of the general narrative about what 
happened from my data and will be supported in the form of short, relevant and illustrative extracts, 
which provide a description of the way things happened. Instead, of using my theory to guide certain 
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coding schemes, I will use it as a theoretical perspective against which I can analyse recent events and 
draw on it for thematic illustrations. This approach adheres to a naturalistic paradigm, hence, offers a 
realist way of looking at the data, in opposition to constructionist one, in which one is interested in 
the meaning making of a certain text, which is in line with the nature of qualitative content analysis 
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
My analysis, will then focus on the extent to which the empirical data relates to the theoretical 
conceptualizations chosen and end with a discussion on the architecture of political communication 
and manipulation as they stand today in the digital age, how the current trends relate to the ideals of 
deliberative democracy, and how they may be consequential to the democratic system in general. 
 
3. Theory  
3.1 Deliberative Democracy 
 
Deliberative democracy is a form of democracy which emphasizes public discourse, public 
consultation, citizens' participation in political, democratic decision-making and, more generally, the 
interaction of deliberation and decision-making.  
While the roots of deliberative democracy can already be found back in the ancient Greek 
philosophies, Jürgen Habermas’s work on communicative rationality and the public sphere is often 
identified as the most influential contribution in this area (Ercan, 2014). The reason I have chosen this 
theoretical framework to analyse recent events of political manipulation is because Habermas (and 
later scholars) have developed a very suitable framework for my overarching interest and motivation 
for this thesis, namely, modern-day challenges to democracy by novel, digital means. The relevance 
of the public sphere for the legitimacy of the whole political system lies in the normative self-
understanding of democracies until today, as theorized by Habermas. The two conceptions that this 
normative self-understanding of democratic systems is based on are, according to Habermas, human 
rights and popular sovereignty (Habermas, 1996, p. 94). These ideas are unquestioned, indispensable, 
and presumed in modern constitutional democracies and therefore constitute the very basis of them 
(Habermas, 1996). It is especially the second idea, popular sovereignty, that this thesis is drawing on 
and that I theorize to be potentially threatened by manipulation in the digital age as illustrated by the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal.  
These concepts of deliberative democracy, the public sphere and popular sovereignty are closely 
related and together make up the overarching project of Habermas’ version of democracy. I will now 
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briefly explain the underlying idea of deliberative democracy, before moving onwards in more detail 
to the trajectory of the concept of the public sphere, which is most central to my thesis. 
 
Deliberative democracy was developed as a response to the legitimation problems of representative 
democracies,  but it is generally not conceived as an alternative to liberal, representative democracy, 
but rather as an expansion of it, where the public deliberation of free and equal citizens become 
central to legitimating collective decisions (Ercan, 2014). Theorists of deliberative democracy however 
differ on the questions of how and to what extent deliberative democracy should work, and different 
strands can therefore be identified. As has already been mentioned, Habermas’ contributions to this 
topic have been especially influential and I will therefore, and due to the limited scope of this thesis, 
focus on his version of deliberative democracy. 
According to Habermas (2006), all theories of democracy are normative to begin with, and simply 
highlight distinct aspects, where the difference lies in a varying emphasis on one of three prerequisites 
for democracy, namely (1) the private autonomy of citizenship, (2) democratic citizenship and (3) the 
independence of the public sphere, which constitutes an intermediary system between state and 
society. These elements are the normative foundation of all versions of liberal democracy, irrespective 
of the potential diversity of constitutional texts and legal orders, political institutions, and practices. 
For Habermas, any democratic design must, among other factors, guarantee “the diversity of 
independent mass media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences to the public sphere” 
(Habermas, 2006, p. 412). Habermas maintains that his communication model of deliberative politics 
holds two critically relevant conditions: Firstly, for a successful deliberative legitimation processes a 
self-regulating and independent media system, which facilitates mediated political communication in 
the public sphere, is of utmost importance, and, secondly, an empowered and responsive civil society 
must be enabled, which has the potential and capabilities for genuine participation within deliberative 
democracy’s communicative processes.  
Beyond its normative demands, Habermas argues that the deliberative paradigm also involves an 
empirical point of reference; a democratic process, which is supposed to generate legitimacy through 
a procedure of opinion and will formation that grants (a) publicity and transparency for the 
deliberative process, (b) inclusion and equal opportunity for participation, and (c) a justified 
presumption for reasonable outcomes (mainly regarding the impact of arguments on rational changes 
in preference). This presumption of reasonable outcomes rests in turn on the assumption that 
institutionalized discourses, in the form of deliberation, bring to discussion relevant topics and claims, 
promote the critical evaluation of contributions, and lead to rationally motivated reactions 
(Habermas, 2006). 
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To Habermas’ thinking, the argument that deliberation must be open to all who are affected by its 
outcome is central (Ercan, 2014). He depicts that there should be no constraints on topics as long as 
it is relevant to the issue under discussion. Habermas’ version requires rational arguments that are ‘in 
the best interest’ of all participants which aims to promote rational reasons, instead of powerful 
interests, as the basis of the common good as well as the path to achieving unanimous consensus as 
a result of public deliberation. Importantly, Habermas conceives deliberation as not only taking place 
in small-scale forums, but rather defining it as a broad communication process, that takes place on 
different levels in the public sphere (Ercan, 2014). A vital public sphere is of central importance to 
Habermas theory, as it constitutes the place where contestation among citizens, groups, movements 
and organizations, and opinion formation can take place. The core function of the public sphere then 
is “to identify social and political problems and thematize them in such a way that they are taken up 
by formal decision-making bodies such as parliaments” (Ercan, 2014).  
The public sphere, the place where deliberation and political opinion formation processes are carried 
out, is therefore the most fundamental concept to his theory of deliberative democracy. It is the very 
arena in which the formation of considered public opinion, the goal of any deliberative democratic 
system, takes place, and where the media holds a central role. And it is especially the modern idea of 
popular sovereignty that gives the theory legitimacy and relevance. Citizen sovereignty, or in other 
words, self-legislation of the people presupposes that people are free and equal (Habermas, 1996). 
The collective opinion- and will-formation that, according to Habermas (1962), takes place in the 
public sphere must be a voluntary process that consequently calls for political participation. As an 
inherent precondition of the collective, presumably rational and necessarily repression-free 
deliberation and will-formation process that is to inform the self-legislation of the people, the free 
individual must be presumed and indeed constitutionally safeguarded, thus, requiring both public and 
private autonomy (Habermas, 1996). 
The two ideas of a deliberative democracy and the public sphere populated by free and equal citizens 
are therefore deeply intertwined and highly relevant. After all, democratic political life, also today, 
can only thrive if institutions allow citizens to debate matters of political importance, and we therefore 
need to create norms and institutions which support this kind of free communication (Calhoun, 2007, 
p. 360).  
It is because of this central importance of the public sphere that I will soon turn to this concept and 
spend some time laying out its development over the last decades. Before I do this however, I have to 
address some of deliberative democracies’ most serious criticism, in order to justify its application in 
my thesis, despite obvious drawbacks. 
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The ideal of deliberative democracy, as well as its public sphere, has been harshly criticized for being 
naïvely utopian in a world where politics is factually about unequal power relations and the 
furtherance of self-interests (Ercan, 2014). Many critics emphasize the gap between the ideal of 
deliberation and the actually existing conditions to show the impracticality of deliberative democracy. 
While some acknowledge that deliberation can in fact be practiced, they characterize it as an 
exclusionary and elitist model of democracy, that fails to take into account the pervasive differences 
of race, gender, and class (Ercan, 2014). Nancy Fraser for example sees the Habermasian notion of the 
public sphere as a unitary bourgeois construct and expands it through a focus on multiple publics 
which includes oppressed minorities as I will show in more detail below. Some of these criticisms have 
already been incorporated into the theory of deliberative democracy and the public sphere and 
modern versions of these concepts have therefore changed somewhat significantly since their original 
coining.  
Even though deliberative democracy is without a doubt a very idealistic, perhaps even somewhat 
unrealistic project, it still bears significance for both, political theorists and practitioners. The core 
idea, namely that reason for and against various options are to be weighed against their merits, cannot 
be denied as an ideal and central idea of liberal democracies. And while it is commonly noted that 
some of the values of deliberative democracy are somewhat discordant from conventional 
democracy, it does unarguably have laudable characteristics which are valued across democracies 
(Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). Deliberative democracy should therefore not be rejected on the basis of its 
idealism, but the question should rather be how it can be achieved, and how can we make democracy 
more deliberative (Fishkin & Laslett, 2003). 
Furthermore, political theory does not need to correspond to political reality in order to be relevant. 
O’Donovan (2013) argues that the holistic political system is too complex to be correctly described by 
any single theory, which could be backed up by empirical data. And secondly, even if such data was 
available, it does not refute the legitimacy of essentially normative theorizing. In saying this, he argues 
that the relevance of deliberative democracy in contemporary political thought is still very much 
justified, and the conditions under which it can work are not as demanding as many of its critics 
suppose. Moreover, within political science, normative theory has frequently served as a guide for 
research, thus bridging the gap between normative theory and empirical reality (Habermas, 2006), 
and giving the idealistic conception both relevance and validity.  
 
Habermas himself was very much aware of the apparent gap of normative theorizing and empirical 
reality with regards to his theory of deliberative democracy. He retains however, that those are only 
prima facie doubts, and that there is an abundance of empirical evidence in favour of the verifiable 
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potential that political deliberation can have. The epistemic dimension of deliberation in the context 
of political will-formation and decision-making is in fact supported by an impressive body of small-
group studies that construe political communication as a mechanism for the enhancement of 
cooperative learning and collective problem solving (see for example Fishkin, 1995; Fishkin & Luskin, 
2005) (although there is also research pointing in the opposite direction and acknowledging the 
harmful consequences of deliberation such as extremism, see e.g. Sunstein, 2000). While deliberation 
surely is a demanding form of communication, Habermas argues that it grows out of inconspicuous 
daily routines of asking for and giving reasons and thus bears significance and application in our 
everyday lives (Habermas, 2006). We can derive from this, that various forms of deliberation are in 
fact practiced, and that deliberation as a form of political communication holds great potential for 
decision making and opinion-formation. Despite its idealistic claims, deliberative democracy is an 
ambitious, yet relevant, and to a certain degree both realizable and realized political theory.  
What I am trying to show here is that, even though Habermas’ theory is very demanding, it is neither 
easily dismissible nor irrelevant. Habermas (and others) have created a very well-established political 
theory around an ideal (rational deliberation on topics of political importance) that is unarguably an 
inherently valued principle in liberal democracies. There is also an abundance of studies that construe 
political communication as a mechanism for the enhancement of cooperative learning and collective 
problem solving, therefore giving the theory empirical relevance. Whether or not this theory can be 
proven to be true, or to what extend it is realized in different democratic systems is not a question I 
want to answer in this thesis. Rather, I want to show that the theory of deliberative democracy, and 
especially its concept of the public sphere with its sovereign, self-legislating citizens, is a relevant and 
well-known theoretical framework, against which I can analyse the new forms of political 
manipulation, as illustrated by the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 
 
3.2 Public Sphere 
 
Habermas coined the term public sphere notably with the 1962 publication of his 
habilitation, Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere). 
Habermas defines the public sphere as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion can be formed” and to which access is guaranteed to all citizens equally (Habermas, in 
Lennox & Lennox, 1974, p.49). Besides his approach to the concept of the public sphere, in this work 
he also lies the foundation for his moral-political theory which revolves around his interest in a 
communicative ideal and is characterized by the idea of inclusive critical discussion, that is free of 
social and economic pressures and where conversational partners treat each other as equals in a 
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cooperative attempt to reach an understanding on matters of common concern (Bohman & Rehg, 
2017), as I have introduced above.  
Historically, the public sphere in Europe developed essentially due to the rise of coffee houses, salons, 
and the newsprint media as a means for critical exchange and conversation in the 18th century and 
replaced the "representational" culture (Calhoun, 2007, p. 360). Habermas postulated that it is the 
reading public, bourgeoise private persons, discussing newspapers and journals in clubs or other 
organized forms, which bridge the gap between the private and the public sphere (Habermas, 1996, 
p. 393). This 18th century bourgeoise public sphere is replaced in the 20th century by something more 
like publicity, in which the general public is manipulated by commercial and party-political interest 
groups (Outhwaite, 1996). Habermas imagines “the public sphere as an intermediary system of 
communication between formally organized and informal face-to-face deliberations in arenas at both 
the top and the bottom of the political system. At the periphery of the political system, the public 
sphere is rooted in networks for wild flows of messages—news, reports, commentaries, talks, scenes 
and images, and shows and movies with an informative, polemical, educational, or entertaining 
content” (Habermas, 2006, p. 415). Hence, newspapers, magazines, radio, and the television are the 
media of this public sphere and thus have a fundamental role within this notion. Public discussion 
depicts the key act in his conception of the public sphere and constitutes the link to his theory of 
deliberative democracy.  
Habermas himself identifies two types of actors without whom a political public sphere could not 
function. Those are politicians and professionals of the media system, for example journalists 
(Habermas, 2006). This emphasis on the role of a free and active media system is central to the notion 
of the public sphere, after all, it is the intermediary system between the state and the society. It is the 
source of information to the public and therefore the driver of political opinion and discussion. This 
thesis will in particular look at social media as a new medium within political processes, and I will 
therefore devote the next chapter to the development of political manipulation on different media 
over time. What is important to note here is the central function of journalists and a free, independent 
press, which meets its role of a political watchdog, and provides its citizens with accurate, objective, 
and fair information on important developments and reflects the work of elected politicians to its 
people. 
Habermas however also witnessed and incorporated the transition from a cultural discourse to a 
culture of mere consumption into his notion of the public sphere, and the role of the media in this 
system (for a summary see Hohendahl, 1982). Habermas argues that in the 18th and 19th century, 
culture was clearly separated from the market, but that by the end of the 19th century, culture has 
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become a commodity that is simply consumed as leisure-time entertainment. For Habermas, the 
transition of the media as a public organ concerned with formulating opinions, becomes quite explicit 
in the example of the press, which is no longer concerned with this primary goal, but instead aligns 
itself largely with the interest of advertisers, a narrative we will encounter several times in the course 
of this work. It is in his original work where Habermas also already criticizes the political consumerism 
which results from an oppressive form of marketization and de-politicisation of democracy, in which 
politicians practice voter hunting periodically, and a staged public opinion is supplied by the 
marketized mass media (Habermas, 1962). To summarize, Habermas, similarly to other scholars of the 
Frankfurter school, saw mass culture in advanced capitalism as a manipulated version of culture, in 
which the masses have become mere objects (Hohendahl, 1982). 
Habermas nevertheless continued to examine the possibilities and limitations of political 
emancipation under conditions of advanced capitalism through his notion of the public sphere. 
Besides these obvious challenges he formulated and refined his normative project as follows; 
Habermas did not see the public sphere as the space where political decision making is taking place – 
this task is reserved for the institutionalized political process. Neither do two people engaging in a 
conversation interact in the public sphere. The public sphere is rather an informally mobilized body of 
nongovernmental discursive opinion, which serves as a counterweight to the state (Fraser, 1992). It 
constitutes the realm of opinion formation and expression for the citizens of a democratic system. 
What makes a variety of opinions into public opinion, according to Habermas is the controversial way 
it comes about, as well as the amount of approval that “carries” it. Aggregates of individual opinions 
can only be called public opinion then, if it has been preceded by a focused public debate and a 
corresponding opinion-focused process which was created in a mobilized public sphere by engaged 
citizens (Habermas, 1996). In other words, the conditions of communication are different, and mark 
the threshold that separate the private and public sphere (Habermas, 1996, p. 393). Habermas goes 
on to argue that this realm forms whenever individuals assemble to form a public body and when they 
form and express their opinions in a free and unrestricted manner. The public sphere thus is a sphere 
which “mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer of public 
opinion” (Habermas et al., 1974, p. 50). The deliberative model of democracy therefore expects the 
political public sphere to ensure the formation of a plurality of considered public opinions (Habermas, 
2006), brought about by means of rational argumentation, critical discussion and the exercise of 
reason.  
While the same criticism of a highly idealistic model and utopian expectations apply here as well, 
Habermas argues that mediated political communication does not always have to fit the pattern of 
fully-fledged deliberation. Rather, political communication circulates “from the bottom up and the top 
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down throughout a multilevel system (from everyday talk in civil society, through public discourse and 
mediated communication in weak publics, to the institutionalized discourses at the centre of the 
political system), [and] takes on quite different forms in different arenas. The public sphere forms the 
periphery of a political system and can well facilitate deliberative legitimation processes by 
‘‘laundering’’ flows of political communication through a division of labour with other parts of the 
system” (Habermas, 2006, p. 415).  
After having introduced the original notion of the public sphere as it was developed in the 1960s by 
Habermas, I now want to take a look at how the conception was modified and updated over time. It 
is also important to mention here that the public sphere is, despite its wide intellectual influence and 
popularity, still an essentially contested concept (Rauchfleisch, 2017). While scholars widely disagree 
on its use and meaning, there is perhaps no “right” interpretation of it (Rauchfleisch, 2017). The way 
that I understand the public sphere, is as a historical concept which was developed by analysing 
actually existing public spheres in the 18th century. While the concept does have normative aspects - 
and its flaws - it is rooted in careful historical analysis which affords its insightfulness and descriptive 
force. Based on this, Habermas’ concept is perhaps not perfectly mirroring, but surely reflective of the 
social reality it aims to describe, as Habermas frequently argued himself (e.g. Habermas, 2006). It is 
for this reason that I found it to be a very suitable tool for this thesis project.  
But besides its general popularity and usefulness, the criticism of Habermas concepts has been 
extensive and serious. His ideal of the bourgeoise public sphere has been criticized for being uncritical, 
sexist, elitist, inflexible, out-dated, and too static. I will address some of the most serious criticisms in 
this paper though I will not be able to go through all of the criticism due to its sheer abundance. My 
aim is to track down an updated conceptualization of the public sphere in the state of the art literature, 
which shows its persistent relevance and usefulness today, and allows me finally to use it as a tool to 
analyse a modern-day challenge to both, the public sphere in particular, and democracy at large. 
The outstanding volume titled Jürgen Habermas and the Public Sphere combines numerous critiques 
and improvements of Habermas’ original conception. While it addresses issues such as the exclusion 
of family and the economy of the public sphere, or the problem or rationality, I want to begin with 
one of its most serious critiques, that led to a crucial advancement of the theory.   
One major criticism has been on Habermas’ focus on the bourgeoise in Europe and his alleged 
ignorance of plurality of society. Feminists have accused Habermas of ignoring or downplaying gender 
and minority issues. Many scholars therefore conclude that in our current pluralistic, welfare state 
mass democracy, Habermas’ bourgeois, liberal model of the public sphere is no longer feasible. Nancy 
Fraser is one of the most prominent scholars criticizing the unsatisfactory acknowledgement of gender 
and minorities in Habermas’ original version of the public sphere. She argues that, while Habermas’ 
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coining of the term might have adequately described the public sphere of the 17th and 18 centuries, it 
is no longer feasible in the current-day welfare state mass democracy (Fraser, 1992). Some new form 
of public sphere is required to salvage that arena's critical function and to revitalize democracy. The 
main problem is that Habermas fails to examine other, non-liberal, non-bourgeois, competing public 
spheres and ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere. The fact that women were excluded from the 
public sphere, according to Fraser (1992), is deeply ideological and rests on a class- and gender-biased 
notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public's claim to be the public. Fraser 
eloquently points out how masculinist gender constructs were built into the very conception of the 
public sphere and led to the formal exclusion of women from political life. She goes on to stress how, 
historically, civil societies all over Europe were anything but accessible to everyone. Sexism was 
therefore a deeply intertwined characteristic of the public sphere, which highlighted gender forms 
enjoining feminine domesticity, which in turn later became hegemonic. Fraser finds it ironic that a 
discourse of publicity which touts accessibility, rationality, and the suspension of status hierarchies is 
itself constructed as a strategy of distinction; bourgeoise men, who were anything but the status quo, 
were coming to see themselves as the universal class of publicity. Status, she reasons, is much more 
complex than Habermas understood, and just postulating that a deliberative arena should be a place 
where status distinctions are neutralized, is not sufficient to make it so. Critical historical 
documentations further show that there were a variety of ways in which women accessed public life 
and engaged in a multiplicity of public arenas already in the 19th century in a variety of ways. Thus, the 
claim that women were excluded from public life turns out to be purely ideological; “It rests on a class 
and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeoise public’s claim 
to be the public” (Fraser, 1992, p. 116), even though bourgeoise men were never in fact the public and 
there have always been a variety of competing counter-publics.  
This criticism shows how the bourgeoise conception of the public sphere was a masculinist ideological 
notion that functioned to legitimate an emergent form of class rule, rather than being an unrealized 
utopian ideal (Fraser, 1992). This ideology turns out to have been a mean of political domination, 
which fostered the shift from a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one.  Fraser unveils 
how the bourgeoise concept of the public sphere is inadequate in so far as that is does not see social 
equality as a necessary condition for participatory parity in the public sphere and she points out how 
societal inequalities infect formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction 
within them. As a solution to this deeply ideological problem, Fraser postulates that in a stratified 
society, a plurality of competing public spheres are a better conception to illustrate and promote the 
ideal of participatory parity than just a single public sphere. She sees an emancipatory potential of the 
dialectic between different roles of subaltern counterpublics: On the one hand it constitutes a space 
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of withdrawal and regroupment, on the other hand a training ground for agitational activities targeted 
at wider public. She goes on to admit that, “although in stratified societies the ideal of participatory 
parity is not fully realizable, it is more closely approximated by arrangements that permit contestation 
among a plurality of competing publics than by a single, comprehensive public sphere” (Fraser, 1992, 
p. 124-125). This allows us to derive a new definition of public spheres which does justice to the 
multiplicity of public arenas in stratified societies. A public sphere then constitutes “the structured 
setting where cultural and ideological contest or negotiation among a variety of publics takes place”. 
Fraser’s enhancements of Habermas’ original conception undermine one of its biggest flaws; the 
bourgeoise man as the normative ideal of the public sphere, and postulates a multiplicity of public 
spheres, rather than just one single arena.  
Some other critiques towards Habermas’ model of the public sphere are related yet deserve to be 
briefly mentioned as well. Especially the assumption of rationality in public discourse is an ever-
recurring topic for discussion. McCarthy for example postulates that it is impossible to reach 
consensus when different needs and interests are involved (Hohendahl, 1992, p. 104), again hinting 
at the neglect of the plurality in any given society, which brings about various needs, values, 
standpoints, and demands. Practical discourse, McCarthy concludes, is simply not suitable at all as a 
normative ideal for discourse in the public sphere. While the importance of a public sphere as a site 
for democratic deliberation can hardly be contested, it is precisely the ostensible inflexibility for the 
concerns of a modern pluralistic society which make Habermas model susceptible for criticism 
(Hohendahl, 1992, p.104). It is nevertheless true that without rationality and reason, public debates 
seem futile as Hohendahl (1992) highlights. Furthermore, an argumentative discourse, is at least 
normatively indispensable in the context of a democratic public sphere. In other words, Hohendahl 
(1992) argues that one does not uncritically have to presuppose universal demonstrative norms for a 
rational debate to be possible and desirable.  
Another recurring criticism concerns the very space of the public sphere, which Habermas, for 
example, thought to exclude the family and the economy. Benhabib (1992) therefore depicts the 
boundaries of a public sphere as rather fluid, and it thus responds to much criticism regarding the 
rather harsh yet fuzzy distinction of public and private. Benhabib (1992) redraws these boundaries 
between the public and the private and pictures them as fluid rather than static. As we will now see, 
this problem is further amplified by the increasing role of the internet and social media as a site for 
discussion and a source of information. I will turn to this recent development next and reproduce how 
the ride of the internet has impacted the concept of the public sphere. 
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3.2.1 The public sphere and the internet 
 
The internet has unarguably changed the way we live. It is infiltrating every aspect of society, private 
and public life, as well as politics, economy, and the global world order. The internet has become an 
important site for both, source for information as well as place for discussion, thus infiltrating the 
public sphere and moving some of its key elements to the intangible space of the world wide web. 
Dahlgren is one well-known scholar who undertakes the task of scrutinizing the impact the internet 
has on the concept of the public sphere. How exactly is it then that the internet permeates the public 
sphere? Dahlgren defines the public sphere as “a constellation of common spaces in society that 
permit the circulation of information, ideas, debates (…) and also the formation of political will” 
(Dahlgren, 2005, p, 148). The mass media, and, in the recent decades increasingly so, the internet, 
serve to facilitate communication and provide information and resources, to both citizens and holders 
of power. 
Dahlgren conceptualizes the public sphere as consisting of three dimensions: the structural, the 
representational, and the interactive. For him the structural dimension constitutes the institutional 
features of the public sphere, such as media organizations, political economy, legal frameworks etc. 
The representational dimension generally refers to the output of the media, which raises all the 
relevant questions of accuracy, fairness, agenda setting etc. In the dimension of interaction, Dahlgren 
reminds us of one of Habermas’ original claims, namely that a public must be more than just a media 
audience. Individuals only transform into a “public” when they enter a discursive interactional process. 
This claim is especially relevant in view of those versions of democratic theory which see deliberation 
as fundamental, such as Habermas’ deliberative democracy (Dahlgren, 2005). The dimension of 
interaction again can be divided into two aspects: the first one has to do with citizens’ engagement 
with the media, how they use, interpret and make sense of the media, while the second aspect is 
between citizens themselves. These three dimensions offer a handy analytical tool to examine the 
state of the public sphere and scrutinize the contribution of new communicative technology to it.  
The rise of the internet accentuates the sprawling character of the public sphere and offers novel 
opportunities and challenges of its own. While it is of course nothing new that novel information and 
communication technologies affect and challenge all areas of life, the political dimension is affected 
to a considerable, and above all very unique, extent. Dahlgren argues that there remains ambiguity 
about the enhancing or disruptive impact on democracies (Dahlgren, 2005). He refers to a review on 
the destabilizing character of political communication in modern Western democracies. Some of the 
factors which contribute to such destabilization are an increasing sociocultural heterogeneity, the 
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difficulty to distinguish journalism from non-journalism, a surplus of media outlets and channels, an 
increasingly strong impact of the market logic within the media landscape, the weakening of 
traditional borders as well as an increasing disengagement among citizens. Today, threats to 
democratic politics and the social welfare state also arise in the struggle for capitalist globalization. 
Citizens can only defend themselves by a new model of solidarity beyond the nation state. Essential 
to this is an activist public sphere where matters of common interest can be discussed, political issues 
deliberated, and the force of public opinion brought to bear on the administrative-political system. 
(Calhoun, 2007, p. 361). Surely the internet can and does constitute such a space for exchange, where 
groups can form, discuss, exchange ideas, coordinate and organize themselves and so forth, but it 
nevertheless also constitutes a new mode of estrangement as the Cambridge Analytica case will 
illustrate. With the rise of the internet and social media, as well as the therewith accompanying 
transformation of the public sphere, Habermas’ work takes on special importance again. How does 
this relatively new mode of mass communication then influence the concept of the public sphere? 
Dahlgren argues that there are obvious positive consequences to the way in which the internet 
extends and pluralizes the public sphere. The fact that the public sphere is not a single space has 
already been established, and also Habermas’ emphasis on the bourgeoisie has been criticised and 
developed further. The internet then most obviously contributes by opening up the public realm in 
terms of accessibility as well as offerings. This pluralization, Dahlgren (2005) argues, not only extends 
but also disperses the clustered public sphere of the mass media. As I will argue in more detail below, 
this widespread heterogenization of the public sphere in the digital age, also brings about a 
fragmentation that is much accentuated from what we know from the “offline” public sphere which 
was most strongly influenced by the traditional mass media (for example Dahlberg, 2007; Sunstein, 
2001; Habermas, 2006). Dahlgren (2005) too acknowledges the trend of subgroups to connect 
internally online before venturing into the larger public sphere, which can lead to what he calls “cyber 
ghettos” – social realms which threaten to undercut a shared public culture and the integrative 
societal function of the public sphere, which in the end may lead to foster intolerance and inhibit 
contact with different-minded people. 
Another problem of a public sphere which is largely situated in the internet is the influence of 
neoliberal and market logics into its very essence. Dahlgren (2005) argues that media industries in 
general, which are driven to a large extent by market forces, increasingly threaten all normative 
considerations which should be elementary to this sector. The sheer power of private capital under 
the prevailing neoliberal order have increasingly constricted and weakened democracy since the 
hegemony of capitalism in the Western world. Where the internet was long seen as a new, grassroots 
way around the issue of power and capital in the media, it is now unfortunately too an integrated 
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element in the dynamics of global capitalism, and market logic coupled with convenient legal 
frameworks (or the lack of such) and the impetus toward political restriction, “serves to constrain the 
extent and forms of representation for civic purposes in ways quite familiar from the mass media, 
diminishing its potential as a properly civic communicative space” (Dahlgren, 2005, p. 151). Moreover, 
issues of political relevance are clearly overshadowed by consumerism, entertainment, and social, 
non-political networking, thus limiting the potential deliberative and democratic potential of the 
internet. 
With the increasing importance of social media websites such as Facebook, which will be the focus of 
my analysis, a common discussion circulating the public sphere concept is amplified; namely the 
distinction between the public and the private. Scholars in the field are largely agreeing that social 
media as political communication tools are accentuating the blurring and liquid boundaries between 
the two spheres (e.g. Fuchs, 2014). While some argue that the rise of social media is a revitalizing 
element for the public sphere and has the potential to facilitate political discussion online, those 
arguments are largely theoretical, and empirical research rather points to the opposite. Qualitative 
research findings indicate low levels of political discussion online, where a lack of civil discourse has 
been named as one potential reason for this shortcoming (Kruse, Norris & Flinchum, 2018). In other 
words, studies suggest that social media as sites for discussions create additional barriers to civil 
political discourse. This trend of uncivil political discussions is even stronger compared with the level 
of uncivility in face-to-face interactions. Social media therefore seems not to revitalize public spheres 
as opposed to many theoretical assumptions (Kruse, Norris & Flinchum, 2018). Furthermore, it is also 
wrong to assume that the internet, and social media sites in particular, allow an unlimited access to 
information, equal access and participation nor is it free of institutional influence (Dahlberg, 2007; 
Kruse, Norris & Flinchum, 2018), as we will see clearly in the Cambridge Analytica example. In line with 
this, Dahlberg (2007) asserts that just like in the offline world, “mainstream’ online discursive terrain 
is being structured by corporate portal and media sites promoting consumer discourse, with debate 
largely confined within the boundaries of market-capitalist assumptions with limited opportunities for 
discursive contestation” (Dahlberg 2007, p. 840). Instead of having a truly revitalizing character and 
being a space for political deliberation, online users appear as passive and individualized consumers, 
who focused on individual pleasure maximization instead of political development (Dahlberg, 2007).  
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3.2.2 The Affective Public Sphere 
 
Corporate social media challenge the concept of traditional media in a number of ways, which I will 
elaborate on in more detail in a following chapter. What is however important to note here, is that 
big data is the new currency of the web, overhauling to monetary profit. This in turn generates a 
number of challenges for the media user which translate to challenges for the public sphere; audiences 
are being commodified by constant, real-time surveillance, predictive algorithms forecast activity with 
an alarming accuracy, limited and personalized content is made available to the user and turn their 
data into a private good, controlled by social media companies, which goes largely unchecked (Fuchs, 
2014; Kruse, Norris & Flinchum, 2018).  
In a public sphere in which access to information is so heavily influenced by algorithmic, personalized 
predictions, manipulation and affect play a whole new, and surely amplified role. Zizi Papacharissi is a 
communication scholar who has researched this field extensively and is one of the most prominent 
names in this research area. She has a number of publications (e.g. Papacharissi, 2004; 2015) which 
highlight exactly this connection between affect and ideology, feeling and belief, emotion and reason, 
which is so relevant to new conceptions of the public sphere in the digital age. Her concept of 
“affective publics”, which considers the role of affect in politics and the ways in which online media 
facilitate political formations of affect, is most relevant to the trajectory of the public sphere and this 
thesis, and I will therefore spend some time now reviewing this concept. 
Papacharissi postulates that there is a constant, however often unrealistic, emphasis on rationality in 
political discourse, which has the consequence that affect and emotions are frequently discounted as 
irrational and disastrous. This is, Papacharissi goes on, even though they are actually a relevant and 
important part of decision making and deliberation. In her book Affective Publics (2015), she 
investigates the role of affect in politics and the ways in which online media facilitate political 
formations of affect. Here she argues, that affect, feeling, and emotion often are the driving force in 
movements that convey rationally focused expressions of ideological and political beliefs, thereby 
addressing one of Habermas’ public sphere’s biggest drawbacks: the rationality bias. 
Papacharissi scrutinizes the relevance of affect in politics in general, as well as its augmentation on 
social media. She argues that social media platforms afford important storytelling infrastructure, as 
they invite participants to tune into events, that people are physically removed from, by allowing them 
to imagine what these might feel like for people directly experiencing them (Papacharissi, 2015). She 
does acknowledge that this capability is neither new, nor specific to digital media. Journalism, and the 
24/7 television news cycle in particular, amplified this ability to affectively tune into distant events 
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previously. Nevertheless, novel forms of media follow, amplify, and remediate that tradition of 
affective storytelling. In line with this, the internet has often been given the role of an entirely novel 
tool for political revolutions such as the Arab Spring or the Occupy movement (Papacharissi, 2015). 
Through social media, disorganized publics may be connected, activated and sustained by feelings of 
belonging and solidarity, via digital networks, however fleeting or permanent those feelings may be. 
The connective affordances of social media help activate the in-between bond of publics on a new 
scale. One of the favourable characteristics of the internet as part of a public sphere is that online 
media afford visibility to voices which are otherwise marginalized by the societal mainstream. 
Papacharissi (2015) claims that the internet indeed pluralizes, but does not inherently democratize 
spheres of social, cultural, political, or economic activity per se. While online media are utilized as 
resources that help accelerate mobilization, they present a necessary but not a sufficient cause for 
radical mobilization and it is rather affect which characterize the networked digital structures of 
expression and connections. Affect, as she goes on to argue, is the sum of feelings about affairs, public 
and private, and constitutes the energy that drives, neutralizes, or entraps networked publics. She 
grounds her arguments in research which suggests that social media facilitate feelings of engagement, 
most notably, by activating latent ties that may be crucial to the mobilization of networked publics. It 
is important to note however that, according to Papacharissi, while media may be capable of 
sustaining and transmitting affect, this will lead to emotions, thoughts, attitudes, and behaviours, 
which are not directly measurable or predictable. We can nevertheless conclude that digital media 
invite affective engagement, through activities that both exploit affective and other labour and 
promise empowerment. 
Papacharissi’s most important contribution is highlighting the liaison, rather than the opposition, of 
emotion and reason. Affect, instead of being a hinderance to political participation, is and always has 
been an integral part of it. A number of examples from the history of political movements shows how 
the discredit of the validity of emotion-driven politics has frequently been used to silence minorities 
and social movements. The women’s rights movement for example, has been strongly fuelled by affect 
and emotions, such as anger, disapproval and resentment, and has led to important and necessary 
political changes. Papacharissi draws on research in psychology to argue that affect is the link between 
how we think and how we act, that affect and cognition are inextricably connected, and that it is 
therefore inherently political. 
In arguing all this, Papacharissi ultimately says that the assumption that democracies are rationally 
based is false. Politics are and always have been messy affairs that are “driven by aspirations of 
rationality” (Papacharissi, 2015, p. 26). Disorder, marginality, and anarchy constitute the habitat for 
affect as opposed to the mainstream hegemony and hierarchy which are upheld by rationality and 
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“logic”. This latter approach to politics further expects rational reactions of citizens, whose typical 
daily responses to political developments are a mix of emotion with fact-informed opinion - not mere 
logic. Finally, and most importantly, this approach marginalizes emotion as an important element of 
political expression. Thus, empowerment lies in liminality, in pre-emergence, emergence and change, 
and often fostered by affect in the first place. In this way, affect may lead to disruptions of power 
hierarchies and therefore constitutes an important political tool, a tool which is often expressed 
through social media online.  
In terms of the public sphere concept, Papacharissi claims that networked publics, meaning publics 
that have been connected via digital media, include civic formations that develop beyond the model 
of the classical public sphere and in this way permit us to consider the novel possibilities for 
engagement that the affordances of convergent technologies, such as the internet and social media, 
introduce. Papacharissi also calls these spheres “third places”, which means to describes informal 
meeting places away from the home and the workplace that are essential to community life, social 
capital, and civic engagement, and are sustained chiefly by conversation, thus adding a new layer to 
the concept of public sphere. The potential of the internet as a public sphere however gets 
compromised by the fact the internet frequently privileges the net savvy, fragments conversation, and 
occurs in commercially driven spaces.  
The line between the private and the public sphere, neatly separated in Habermas’ notion, is blurred 
here. Various online activities, she goes on to argue, are increasingly supported by such hybrid spaces 
which blur the public and the private, civic and consumption-based, collective and personal narratives 
that assemble the story of who we are, and these stories are personal and political. Furthermore, life 
in and around the media blends the aesthetics of commercial and alternative, public and private, 
entertainment and politics, work and leisure, individuation and collectivism, and countless other 
dualisms around which we have organized our everyday routines in the past, including, as she 
concludes, rationality and affect. 
To summarize; while Habermas theories, and with it the conception of the public sphere are clearly 
not free of flaws, it remains a tool to hold the state accountable to society via publicity (Fraser, 1992), 
an act that is indispensable and inherent in any democracy as I have argued above. With some 
refinements that acknowledge recent developments in the medial system, as well as the problem of 
inclusivity and elitism, the public sphere conception still represents an adequate tool to analyse 
important parts of democracy-related incidents like the Cambridge Analytica scandal.  
Modern conceptions of the public sphere highlight various, rather than a single sphere. The lines 
between public and private, economy and domestic, rationality, and affect are blurred, however not 
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dispensable. The internet as a site for political discussions has extended the reach of public spheres, 
although it still constitutes a space that is much more frequently used for consumption and 
entertainment than for discussion or deliberation.   
An important question that for example also Papacharissi poses, is how people can develop 
mechanisms for resisting systematic ideological exploitation and knowledge management which 
operate through affective control and manipulation; an issue that becomes all the more accentuated 
after the Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018. I will now move on to review the history of political 
manipulations via older and newer forms of media and then analyse the impact of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, through the conceptual framework of modern public spheres.  
 
4. A short history of political manipulation   
 
The literature on political manipulation is vast. The stories of both, the history and development of 
propaganda, as well as new forms of this in the digital age fill whole book shelfs. Therefore, I had to 
be very selective, and was not able to cover all the important work done in the field. For this chapter 
I have instead selected the work that is relevant for the argument I am building in my thesis. In doing 
so, I will argue that, while political manipulation has always existed, and various forms spread in well-
known formats to the digital sphere, there is nevertheless a fundamentally novel development, that 
requires new thoughts, debate, policies, and regulations. I hope that this will become clear through 
the work I have chosen to review in what follows.  
Politics and its communication have never been a straightforward and simple endeavour. And what 
constitutes political manipulation or propaganda is not always clear-cut. The main aim of this thesis is 
to analyse the forms of political manipulation in the digital age and explore how they impact the public 
sphere and democratic system in general. In doing this, I of course assume that there is something 
special and novel about political manipulation today, compared to the forms of political manipulation 
that have always existed. Therefore, this chapter will be devoted to documenting the development of 
political manipulation and propaganda. While it is often assumed that the forms of manipulation that 
are being practiced right now are merely more effective quantitatively, but essentially nothing new, I 
want to show that there is in fact a qualitative difference in the ways we are being manipulated today, 
and that this poses novel challenges to democracies in post-industrial Western liberal societies.  
It is of course difficult to make claims about the performances and processes of the entirety of media 
systems in all Western democracies. The Cambridge Analytica scandal, the focus if my thesis, has 
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however had tangible influences on the 2016 presidential elections in the United States as well as the 
Brexit referendum in the same year. It thus suggests itself to focus on the USA and the UK especially 
in this context. I nevertheless want to emphasize the transnational relevance and impact of these 
developments in the digital world. Not least through technology and digitalization, borders are 
becoming more and more meaningless. Everyone with an unrestricted internet connection has access 
to (almost) everything at any time. Social media connects people all over the world (while also doing 
many other, much more dubious things), lets us be part of other peoples’ lives, no matter how far 
away. Moreover, Western liberal democracies, besides all their differences and variations, share 
important traits and cultures: The Western democratic system is built upon the principles of 
representative democracies which are characterised by elections between multiple distinct political 
parties, a separation of powers into different branches of government, the rule of law in everyday life 
as part of an open society, a market economy with private property and the equal protection 
of human rights, civil rights, civil liberties and political freedoms for all people. Because of these very 
important and concrete similarities I believe it is fair to make some assumptions about the ideal of 
press freedom and media operations across Western countries, despite the disparity in media 
systems. Because of my choice of available literature, and the already mentioned special relevance for 
the USA and the UK of the Cambridge Analytica scandal, I will focus on those countries in particular. I 
do however want to make claims about Western liberal democracies in general, which currently 
witness a vital change in the media landscape and the political sphere. The public sphere, the concept 
I am using to analyse the given changes, is too idealizing an intangible space across boundaries, and I 
want to continue in this tradition. 
 
4.1 Propaganda: A historical excursion  
 
Historically, the term propaganda implied a more neutral meaning than today. The term originally 
derives from the Latin term propagare and simply means to reproduce or to spread. It gained currency 
in the 17th Century where the Roman Catholic church utilized the term to describe their missionary 
activities. The term was then advanced to also describe the advancement of secular causes in the 
English language and finally took on its political, and with it a more negative, meaning in the mid-19th 
century (Diggs-Brown, 2011). World War I and II notably added to the negative connotation of the 
word and more benevolent, apolitical, forms of communications are today replaced with less morally 
frightening terms such as “public relations”, “strategic communications”, and “marketing” (Benkler, 
Faris & Roberts, 2018). The  state- of- the- art definition of propaganda adopted by the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis in 1937 reflects the common, modern-day understanding of the word: 
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“Propaganda is the expression of opinions or actions carried out deliberately by individuals or groups 
with a view to influencing the opinions or actions of other individuals or groups for predetermined 
ends and through psychological manipulations.” (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 26). Today, the 
term shifted to become a critical framework from which to criticize modern liberal market societies, 
most famously in Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media which I will discuss in more detail below. 
 
A definition I find even more useful is the one from Benkler, Faris & Roberts’ (2018) which they 
developed in their notable book Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and 
Radicalization in American Politics which I will review in more detail later. In their words, propaganda 
is “communication designed to manipulate a target population by affecting its beliefs, attitudes, or 
preferences in order to obtain behaviour compliant with political goals of the propagandist” (Benkler, 
Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 29). This is very helpful as it limits the term to intentional communications 
which are targeted at a population with a political aim, as well as making a reference to affect, which 
I believe, and will later on argue, plays an important role in political communication in the digital age. 
There is clearly a tension between this understanding of propaganda and a deliberative or 
participatory view of democracy (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018), as for example theorized by 
Habermas. While this concern was already explicitly present in Lippmann’s essential 1922 Public 
Opinion, the concern intensifies today’s political sphere, which is precisely the topic of this work. For 
this thesis, I also want to add a definition for manipulation, an important element of propaganda, 
which the authors of Network Propaganda define as “directly influencing someone’s beliefs, attitudes, 
or preferences in ways that fall short of what an empathetic observer would deem normatively 
appropriate in context” (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 30). Manipulation adds to propaganda, the 
“need to explain why the communication falls short of a normative ideal for how beliefs, attitudes, or 
preferences ought to be shaped. Outright false or materially misleading communications are relatively 
easy to categorize as normatively inappropriate, but emotionally evocative language presents harder 
questions” (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 31). They continue that “manipulation is a necessary 
part of justifying the normatively negative connotation of “propaganda” and that connotation must 
have a well- defined normative foundation other than “I don’t agree with what they said.” (Benkler, 
Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 32). In this paper, I use the terms rather interchangeably, as my topic is 
precisely the political aspect of manipulation, and is therefore, in my view equitable with propaganda.  
 
I will now turn to the work on propaganda and political manipulation I have selected to illustrate the 
development of this field. I have constructed this chapter chronologically, where I start in the 1980s 
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(with case studies from as early as the Roman Empire) and end with the most recent work in the field, 
which emphasizes the novel character of political manipulation in the digital age. 
 
4.2 Riker: The art of political manipulation 
 
In his book The art of political manipulation (1986) William Riker gives a historical overview over 
exactly that – political manipulation. He compiled twelve stories spanning the ancient Roman Senate 
of Pliny the Younger to Lincoln and finally to the then contemporary U.S. Senate of Warren Magnuson 
which is rich with historical detail and tellingly shows the art of exploiting agendas and rules. The book 
offers a vivid picture of how leaders in democratic societies over time forged agreements when no 
underlying consensus existed (Fowler, 1987). Riker applies social choice theory and his concept of 
herestethic; which denotes a strategic way to structure the world in a way that you compel your 
audience, without necessarily being persuaded by good arguments (Riker, 1986). Riker, a notable 
social-choice scholar, applies this tradition to show how individual members of a group are 
consolidated into a decision for the group as a whole. Riker draws this social-choice tradition (and the 
Arrow’s theorem in particular), to explain that, as long as choice depends in part on the way it was 
chosen, then politicians can reasonably be expected to change the outcome if they can changed the 
way that questions are posed. The reasons why agendas are manipulated he continues, is because 
agendas, and indeed institutions are manipulatable, and no institution or agenda can it be guaranteed 
to be independent of the method by which it was chosen. It is therefore natural, that strategic 
manipulation plays a fundamental part in politics where politicians want to persuade a large group of 
people. In this book, Riker gives examples of how in democracies, outcomes are not always the “will 
of the people” but rather mostly an unanticipated combination of wills of participants and of the way 
relevant politicians have set the “machine of aggregation” to implement their own wills. What does 
this book tell us with regard to political manipulation? It points out that appeals to unconscious 
processes regarding political opinion formation have indeed always existed, and that flaws (or 
manipulation) are often inherent in the method we choose to arrive at a conclusion. 
What the work on political manipulation and propaganda thus far had in common was the general 
agreement about the difficulty of an objective mass opinion formation, the susceptibility of the 
unconscious and the difficulty of governing the novel masses of post-industrial societies without 
creating some form of consent. What changed with the following work in the field of media studies, 
is its focus on the critical tradition when scrutinizing the (US) media landscape and the consideration 
of the impact of market dynamics in favour of the elite. This form of critique of the mass media became 
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quite prominent in the aftermath of this book in the 1980s to the early 2000s, and it thus constitutes 
and important cornerstone in the history of political manipulation. 
 
4.3 Herman and Chomsky: Manufacturing Consent 
 
In Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media from 1988, Herman and Chomsky 
develop a propaganda model which is applied to the performance of the mass media in the USA. The 
two authors challenge the democratic postulate that the media are independent and committed to 
discovering and reporting the truth, and that they are presumably not merely reflections of power. 
The media commonly claims to be objective and independent but the authors argue that if the 
powerful are in the position to fix the premises of the discourse, and manage public opinion by 
propaganda, the “standard view of how the system works is at serious odds with reality” (Herman & 
Chomsky, 1988, preface). Herman and Chomsky define propaganda as the “manufacture of consent” 
and borrow the term from the American journalist and media critic Walter Lippman. Propaganda, they 
argue, is a “regular organ of popular government” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, preface). 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model focuses on the inequality of wealth and power and its 
profound, multi-level effects on the mass-media’s interests and choices. In doing so, they developed 
a model that works through five filters, through which the raw material of news content must pass, 
leaving the cleansed product ready to be published, and ultimately ensures the hegemony of elite 
interests. This propaganda model suggests that the media is not, as commonly believed, providing the 
public with unbiased and objective information and facts, but instead are both, dominated by and 
upholding the dominant economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups. They showed that 
the media do this in many ways: through selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing issues, 
filtering information, emphasis and tone, and by keeping debates within the boundaries of acceptable 
premises. In their book they give empirical support through content analysis of several cases as well 
as paired comparison, which demonstrate the subordination of the media to the requirements of the 
state propaganda system. It is important to note that Herman and Chomsky do not claim that the US 
media function in the manner of a propaganda system of a totalitarian state. Rather, they permit and 
even encourage spirited debate and criticism and dissent as long as these remain faithfully within the 
system of presupposition and principles that constitute an elite consensus, a system that is so 
powerful that it is internalized perhaps even without awareness. What they do show however, is that 
it is very difficult for news to find their way into the mass media if they fail to conform to the 
framework of established dogma. In many cases media professionals do similar things because they 
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see the world through the same lenses, are subject to similar constraints and incentives, and thus 
feature stories or maintain silence together in collective action and leader-follower behaviour. 
I will now describe each of the five filters briefly below to provide some context, before moving on to 
some of the model’s most serious criticism and discussion. The first filter is related to concentration 
of media ownership and the limitation on ownership of media with any substantial outreach by the 
requisite large size of investment was applicable a century or more ago and it has come increasingly 
effective over time. By the time of the first publication of the book in 1986, there were around 2500 
media entities in the US, but the 29 largest ones accounted for about half the output of newspapers. 
Today, this trend has intensified dramatically and in 2012 90% of the media output in the US was 
controlled by only six companies (Lutz, 2012). The consequence of such intense concentration of 
power, according to Herman and Chomsky, is something like a private ministry of information and 
culture which can set the national agenda. Herman and Chomsky show that most media entities are 
owned and controlled by a small number of wealthy individuals, which are integrated into the stock 
and bank market and are therefore profit-seeking corporations. While this fact does not immediately 
convey control, it surely allows investors can make themselves heard. Similarly, the second filter refers 
to the reliance of advertisement as the primary source of income which tend to drive out of existence 
or marginalize media companies and types that depend on revenue from sales alone. This advertising 
system does not yield a neutral system in which buyers choices decide, but instead a system in which 
advertisers choices influence media prosperity and survival. Advertisers will seek out profitable targets 
only, which in turn sharply impoverishes the plurality of the media landscape, and the authors 
emphasize how especially working-class and radical newspapers are at a disadvantage. The third filter 
concerns the issue of sourcing. Here the authors address the symbiotic relationship of journalists with 
powerful sources of information. By economic necessity and reciprocity of interests, it makes sense 
that resources are concentrated where news happen. This leads to a moral division of labour in which 
officials have and give the facts and reporters merely get them. According to the authors, this leads to 
powerful sources regularly taking advantage of these media routines and which allows them to 
“manage” or to manipulate the media into following a special agenda or framework. The fourth and 
fifth filter – flak and anticommunism – describe a system in which negative feedback by government 
officials, in form of letters before congress or other modes of compliant, threat or punishment, impact 
media profitability. The ability to produce such flak is of course again related to power which in turn 
enables elites to act on the basis of their own principles which are, with rare exceptions, culturally and 
politically conservative. This strong bias towards a conservative or right-winged media culture in the 
US is also the main finding of Benkler, Faris, and Roberts’ Network Propaganda and it thus seems that 
Chomsky and Herman’s analysis was not only correct but has since also intensified.  
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Herman and Chomsky’s model has been harshly criticized, one of the most common being the 
dismissal of the model as a conspiracy theory. Herman and Chomsky have addressed this criticism 
directly in newer editions of the book and emphasize that they are not depicting an active conspiracy 
on the part of journalists or the media, but instead point out problems that are inherent in the US 
market system of the media. A variety of scholars have also noted that Chomsky’s work is often being 
dismissed systematically, which is likely driven by an ideological frame of reference (Comeforo, 2010). 
Many scholars have in fact agreed with the model and have pointed out how it successfully shows, 
not the flaws of individual journalists, but how journalists in the US are bounded by a profit-driven 
system (see Comeforo, 2010). While some criticism and inconsistencies of course remain, the model 
has been shown to be applicable in a wide range of cases and context, even outside of the US 
(Comeforo, 2010). Comeforo argues that, “to ignore the model and the levers of power it lays bare is 
to allow the status quo of the ‘system’ to remain unchallenged, and therefore flies in the face of critical 
theory.” Critical theory, he continues, “does not claim objectively, but rather moves from a strong, 
stated ideological perspective and commits to it” (Comeforo, 2010, p. 227). The authors provide 
empirical evidence for their claims via a careful and systematic content analysis. Coupled with their 
critical social theory approach their book offers an insightful look into the hegemony and structural 
bias of the US media system, which has built the myth of a democratic and objective media. Other 
notable contributions in this vein include Ben Bagdikian’s Media Monopoly, Neil Postman’s Amusing 
Ourselves to Death, Robert McChesney’s Rich Media, Poor Democracy, and Ed Baker’s Media, Markets, 
and Democracy (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018). 
To summarize, Herman and Chomsky’s model shows us that propaganda is deeply ideological and 
hegemonic. By an elite domination of the media system, the illusion of a democratic and objective 
media has been created which Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model was able to dismantle 
within the tradition of critical theory. While many news professionals operate in complete integrity 
and goodwill, and believe to be working objectively, this is only true within the limits of the filter 
constraints which are extremely powerful and built into the system in such a fundamental way that 
alternative bases of news are hardly imaginable. Herman and Chomsky do acknowledge that the 
media is free, but only within the very principles that serve the societal purpose. More or less subtle 
forms of propaganda have therefore always been present and have, historically, always been closely 
attuned to elite interests. Consequently, we can retain that news and the media were never free from 
propaganda and systematic errors. Yet, it was a very different kind of manipulation as I will argue in 
what follows. With the emergence of the internet, and the shift of our information and media sources 
online, we have entered an utterly new and substantially different era of media manipulation, which 
is not only more effective quantitatively, but indeed of a qualitatively different nature.  
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While the propaganda models that Herman and Chomsky, as well as Riker described did not allow for 
a critical and fair representation of reality via the media, it nevertheless communicated a more or less 
unified propagandistic picture. With the pluralising nature of the internet, and the accompanying 
fragmentation of the public(s), political manipulation in the digital age divides societies in a not-before 
seen dimension as I will argue below. 
 
4.4 Political manipulation in the digital age 
 
In this section I want to review novel forms of political manipulation. In doing so, I will argue that there 
is a qualitative difference in the way that people were manipulated previously and now, in the digital 
age. My claim is that these changes are illustratively evidenced by the case of Cambridge Analytica 
This new phenomenon deserves special attention in order to adequately face the challenges that 
threaten democracy, and the political system as we know it. Only if we acknowledge a problem we 
can respond appropriately; and to say that today’s political manipulation is just reaching larger 
quantities of people is greatly underestimating both the potential as well as the danger to democratic 
ideals of propaganda online. In this section I will review novel forms of propaganda, such as 
computational and network propaganda, before moving on to the problem of social media 
monopolies and filter bubbles. 
Numerous studies indicate, that more and more people are finding and consuming news on social 
media platforms, primarily Facebook, as opposed to more traditional media forms such as radio, print, 
and television (Pew Research Centre, 2018; Reuters, 2019). In 2018 the number of adults who got 
their news on social media was as high as 68%, of which 43% were corresponding to news via Facebook 
alone (Pew Research Centre, 2018). What is so interesting about this development is that mainly 
because of the social network’s inherent algorithms, an ever-growing number of news consumers now 
find and follow sources of news that solely are limited to what they "like" on their personalized 
Facebook feeds (Pew Research Centre, 2016). But also, the far-reaching fake news debate has had an 
effect on social media users; according to the 2018 Pew study on social media usage, 57% of all social 
media users expect that news on social media are inaccurate. Notwithstanding, numerous studies 
indicate that people are quite bad at actually distinguishing real from fake news, and most think that 
they themselves are not susceptible to the deceiving character of fake news (see for example Jang & 
Kim, 2018).  
The extreme concentration of power, especially with regards to the media system, has already been 
adequately criticized by Herman and Chomsky in the 80s, and I have provided some statistics that 
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show an intensifying tendency in this arena today. What is however even more worrisome, is the 
uncontested monopoly status of just a handful of companies in the tech industry. Facebook is the 
unchallenged monopoly in the social media world, and Google, YouTube, and Amazon are further 
examples of the immense concentration of power online. Today around 90% of internet searches are 
via Google, some statistics state that up to 94% of young people have a Facebook profile, and only 1% 
of smartphones use an operating system that is not developed by Google and Apple (Cable, 2018). 
This concentration of power poses many problems: sloppy, yet uncontested privacy practices, slow 
responses to violent rhetoric and fake news, a huge danger for abuses of power just to name a few. 
Facebook, often emphasizes its status as merely a social media platform, thus eluding from many 
responsibilities. Practically, Facebook is however both, a platform and a publisher and in this it is 
inevitably making decisions about values (Hughes, 2019). Even Facebook’s co-founder, Chris Hughes 
acknowledges that “the most problematic aspect of Facebook’s power is [Zuckerberg’s] unilateral 
control over speech. There is no precedent for his ability to monitor, organize and even censor the 
conversations of two billion people” (Hughes, 2019). Zuckerberg, owning three core communication 
platforms (Facebook, Instagram, Whatsapp), indeed has an unprecedented power. Further, because 
it dominates social networking, Facebook faces no market-based accountability (Hughes, 2019). Even 
when people want to quit Facebook, they don’t have any meaningful alternative. This concentration 
of power is not the exact focus of this thesis, but it does intensify the urgency of the topic: with a huge 
influence on the market, users/consumers and now also politics, and no meaningful alternatives, Mark 
Zuckerberg, and his media platforms, are indisputably having an influence over billions of people in 
the world that is unprecedented.  
Not only unrestricted power, but also media manipulation continues to play a pivotal role in the digital 
age of news consumption: Trump’s infamous attacks on traditional media outlets and a continuous 
decrease in trust in the media (Reuters, 2019), raise new questions and challenges about how to fulfil 
the news media basic mission in a balanced and fair way in the digital age.  
“Media manipulation" however, has a double meaning today. While it is certainly possible to have a 
biased media outlet which manipulates news and intentionally or unintentionally misleads the public, 
there is also a second, a rather reversed form of media manipulation. According to Fitzpatrick (2018), 
in this era of social media, it is certainly possible that the media itself can be manipulated and misled 
by individuals and organizations.  
Increasingly, there are examples for this: false information, retouched photographs, or edited videos 
are being released on social media and are then picked up by traditional media outlets and 
disseminated even further. In many cases, this happens because information goes "viral" in a very 
short period and traditional media are picking up this trend. According to Fitzpatrick, the competitive 
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nature of journalism plays a role in this, in a way that it can lead to reporters and/or their supervisors 
to feeling pressured to report something as news as soon as possible without first verifying its 
authenticity. One of the major challenges is that the sophistication of social media platforms and their 
users means the speed at which information is disseminated has increased dramatically and continues 
to accelerate (Fitzpatrick, 2018).  
These and other developments, such as big data, bots, fake news, algorithms and filter bubbles, create 
challenges that are new for media professionals and consumers. In the following sections I will 
illustrate and explain some of these new challenges in some more depth. I will focus on network 
propaganda, as well as computational propaganda, and also discuss the novel phenomenon of filter 
bubbles. There are still many sociologically relevant questions about the specific mechanisms of 
influence, which are complex and difficult to answer: How do forms of civic engagement affect political 
outcomes? To what extent do online echo chambers and selective exposure to information promote 
political extremism? And to what extent does manipulation online translate to a change in voting 
intentions or attitudes? While we cannot answer all of these questions in detail yet, I now want to give 
an overview over what we do already know about political manipulation in the digital age. 
 
4.4.1 Computational politics: Before Trump and Cambridge Analytica 
 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal was surely a wake-up call for many, and showed just how far 
algorithms, big data, and online propaganda have already entered our political sphere. There were 
nevertheless people who worried about the influence of the internet on politics much earlier on. 
Zeynep Tufekci is one such scholars who engaged with the implications of digital technologies on 
politics early on. In her 2014 paper she analysed the dynamics that gave rise to what she calls 
computational politics on the basis of Obama’s campaign, which was to date quite sophisticated, 
though it has been outmoded by Trump’s campaign by many factors. Before going more into detail 
about the practical side of this, I want to present her account on the social implications of this 
development, before its impact became blatantly obvious. Tufekci (2014) described new technologies 
to be able to carry out “highly effective, opaque and unaccountable campaigns of persuasion and 
social engineering in political, civic and commercial spheres” (Tufekci, 2014, p. 1). Big data, Tufekci 
argues, needs to be examined as a political process which involves questions of power, transparency 
and surveillance. She presents six intertwined dynamics that give rise to computational politics: the 
rise of big data, the shift away from demographics to individualized targeting, the opacity and power 
of computational modelling, the use of persuasive behavioural science, digital media enabling 
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dynamic real-time experimentation, and the growth of new power brokers who own the data or social 
media environments. She describes computational politics as a set of political practices which depends 
on, but is not solely defined by, the existence of big data and accompanying analytic tools and is 
defined by the significant information asymmetry. By this she means that, while the campaigners know 
a lot about the targeted individual voters, the voters themselves do not know what campaigners know 
about them. 
Tufekci argues that computational politics introduces significant qualitative differences to the long 
march of historical trends I have sketched out above. Unlike previous data collection efforts which 
required complicated and time-consuming techniques, and allowed only for broad profiling in the 
aggregate, new data technologies provide significantly more individualized profiling and modelling, 
much greater data depth, and can be collected in an invisible, latent manner and delivered 
individually. 
Following her analysis, Tufekci concludes that big data driven computational politics engenders many 
potential consequences for politics in the digital era. An interesting point she makes, something I will 
pick up later on in my analysis, is that this form of big data enabled computational politics is a private 
one, and is at its core opposed to the very idea of a civic space as a public, shared commons; an idea 
that is closely related to Habermas’ ideal democracy. With the pluralising nature of the internet, and 
the accompanying fragmentation of the public(s) Tufekci concludes, political manipulation in the 
digital age divides societies in a not-before seen dimension, a claim that is backed up by what will 
follow.  
I will now continue with a closer, and more practical look at computational propaganda and its effects 
on the networked public as one could call it. 
 
4.4.2 Computational Propaganda 
 
With new forms of media emerging, there are also new forms of propaganda popping up all over the 
media landscape. In an ever-changing political environment, digital technologies provide the platform 
for a great deal of contemporary civic engagement as well as political action, which brings about new 
opportunities but also new challenges. As I have already mentioned above, various studies have 
shown that social media play an important role in the circulation of news, ideas, and conversations 
about politics and public policy. This also makes these platforms prone to be vehicles for manipulative 
disinformation campaigns.  
34 
 
Computational propaganda is one new term to describe political manipulation in the digital age. More 
precisely, computational propaganda describes the phenomenon of digital misinformation and 
manipulation. It interprets this phenomenon in light of the use of algorithms, automation, and human 
curation which are applied to purposefully manage and distribute misleading information over social 
media networks. As part of this process, coders develop and use automated software products (such 
as bots - automated software built to mimic real users), which will learn from and imitate legitimate 
social media users in order to manipulate public opinion across a diverse range of platforms and device 
networks. In other words, political campaigns, governments, and regular citizens around the world are 
employing combinations of people and bots in an attempt to artificially shape public life (Woolley & 
Howard, 2018). This is especially relevant for the political public sphere. I will get back to this in more 
detail later on, do however find it important to point out that the intention of applying these bots on 
social media is explicitly to artificially shape the perception of a widely shared public opinion and the 
general atmosphere in a given context.  
In order to lay out the new opportunities as well as challenges of computational propaganda, I will 
mainly draw on the book Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political 
Manipulation on Social Media (2019), edited by Sam Woolley and Phil Howard from the Oxford 
Internet Institute which. This insightful book is a collection of country-specific case studies and 
features a comprehensive  introduction to this new field of research. 
Computational propaganda is a new form of manipulation online, which typically involves one or more 
of the following ingredients: bots that automate content delivery, fake social media accounts, often 
managed by bots, as well as junk news (misinformation about politics and public life). Bots are 
software applications that behave like real people online, mainly by generating and responding to 
messages. They are usually deployed all over social media sites in order to amplify or suppress 
particular political messages. In combination with human troll armies (real internet users who quarrel 
in the net with the intention to provoke other users) they can be managed to manufacture consensus 
or otherwise give the illusion of general support for a, maybe controversial, political idea or policy 
with the goal of creating a bandwagon effect. Social bots are programmed to pass as genuine social 
media users and can rapidly deploy messages, interact with other people’s content, and affect or 
manipulate trending algorithms. For these reasons, bots are effective tools for driving online 
propaganda and hate crimes and artificially shape and distort public life. Studies have found that bots 
generate about half of all web traffic and recent estimates suggest that over one third of Twitter’s 
users are in fact bots (Woolley & Howard, 2018). Furthermore, conservative estimates suggest that 
around 83 million Facebook-accounts are fake, which corresponds to the entire population of 
Germany. The immense scale of this has been unpreceded. Automation and anonymity and the 
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immense potential for a far-reaching scope lie at the heart of these forms of manipulation and 
distinguish it from previous forms. Numerous studies on computational propaganda in various 
countries and contexts provide evidence for the fact that many social media platforms, especially in 
the political context, are to a significant extent controlled by governments and organized 
disinformation campaigns. Half of Russia’s twitter activity, for example, is managed by highly 
automated accounts and a majority of political tweeting in Poland is produced by just a handful of alt-
right accounts. The World Economic Forum has therefore rightly identified the rapid spread of 
misinformation online as one the top 10 threats to society (Woolley & Howard, 2018). 
One of the most damaging forms of computational propaganda is the spreading of false news reports, 
which is again mostly achieved by bots on social media platforms. Because of social media’s business 
models and the interrelated nature of the algorithms, they favour sensationalist content, thus 
accelerating the problem (Woolley & Howard, 2018, p.9). Newer forms of bots can even gather 
information on other users in order to push a particular and personalized argument or agenda. This 
technique infiltrates social media platforms with a high degree of success and thus diminishes the 
democratic potential of the internet. Social media bots further manufacture consensus by artificially 
amplifying traffic around a political candidate or issue. Armies of bots make a candidate look more 
legitimate and more widely supported than he or she actually is. This can evoke political support 
where this might not have previously happened by giving the illusion of widespread support. This can 
then lead to actual support through a bandwagon effect. Trump for example, received far more media 
attention than any other candidate in the 2016 presidential elections (his free media attention was 
worth 5 billion dollars to be exact); as Woolley & Howard (2018) put it: “The press may not be 
successful in telling its readers what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what 
to think about” (Woolley & Howard, 2018, p. 190). It is commonly agreed that Trump’s victory is largely 
due to his successful digital campaign, his unfiltered use of twitter, as well as some more dubious, 
especially digital, campaign strategies which I will discuss in more detail later on. Many government 
officials and campaigners actually do not deny the use of computational propaganda such as bots, but 
they often say it is unlikely to have influenced elections because “likes do not equal votes” (Woolley 
& Howard, 2018, p. 195). An in-depth study of the 2016 presidential elections however shows that 
bots reached positions of measurable influence in the elections, and that bots were more actively 
involved in influencing the uptake of Trump-related hashtags than Clinton-related hashtags (Woolley 
& Howard, 2018). 
Leading researchers in the field come to the conclusion that bots are a growing threat to (American) 
democracy, especially given that more than 60% of Americans now rely on social media for political 
discussions and news content (Woolley & Howard, 2018, p. 195). If it can be shown that bots do 
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influence political discussion online, which is already starting to happen, then it becomes tenuous to 
view social media websites as neutral spheres for the democratic marketplace or ideas (Woolley & 
Howard, 2018).  
Those new tools also bring about complex socio-technical issues and create a new field of the influence 
of technology on politics. This entails new tasks for politicians, policy makers, citizens and academics. 
If academic research on these novel forms of propaganda do not engage with the systems of power 
and knowledge that produce it (the human actors and motivations behind it), “then the very possibility 
of improving the role of social media platforms in public life evaporates” (Woolley & Howard, 2018, 
p. 5). Engagement and the recognition of these new socio-technical challenges is therefore of utmost 
importance, and I hope that this thesis can contribute to this endeavour. 
As already mentioned, automation, scalability, and anonymity are the hallmarks of computational 
propaganda. The advantage is that this new form of propaganda enables the rapid distribution of large 
amounts of content, often personalized in nature. It is precisely this personalization that makes 
computational propaganda fundamentally different to previous means of propaganda, as I will argue 
below with regards to filter bubbles and echo chambers. While propaganda surely has existed 
previously, as I have briefly sketched out above, this has always been a shared experience for citizens. 
While the tactic of distributing false news and hate against opponents is not a new tactic at all, the 
difference to today’s propaganda is the immense personalization and fragmentation that is brings 
about.  
Another problem that Woolley and Howard (2018) also acknowledge on several occasions in their 
book, is the underlying market problem of the social media landscape that I have acknowledged 
before as well; a small circle of giant tech companies controls and directs the flow of information 
through profit-driven algorithms, diminishing regulatory and public concerns just as much as 
competition. While social media are significant platforms for political engagement, crucial channels 
for disseminating news content and the primary media over which young people develop their political 
identities, they are at the same time vessels for control. This is especially problematic because 
companies like Facebook have effectively become monopoly platforms for public life – monopolies 
that go largely unchecked and uncontrolled, yet, have such a huge impact on shaping the political 
public sphere. This raises the question of responsibility of the platform owners, which will come up at 
several points in this thesis: While social media platforms typically do not see themselves as media 
platforms, thus not having to obey to the same checks and standards as professional journalistic 
institutions do, they do control information flow and could therefore be classified as media companies 
instead of neutral platforms. By using trending features, algorithmic curation and personalized news 
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feeds, these companies arbitrate truth (Woolley & Howard, 2018), a role that should be checked more 
responsibly, transparently, and democratically.  
 
4.4.3 Network Propaganda 
 
In Network Propaganda: Manipulation, Disinformation, and Radicalization in American Politics, 
Benkler, Faris and Roberts study the transformation of the American public sphere in light of the 
United States political media landscape. They sketch a detailed map of this landscape based on the 
analysis of millions of stories and social media posts, revealing a highly polarized and asymmetric 
media ecosystem. In doing so, the authors argue that the current epistemic crisis in political 
communication in the USA is not the result of, as often believed, novel technologies, social media or 
Russian influence, but is instead due to structural weaknesses in media institutions.  
In the first part of the book the authors document how the right- wing media ecosystem in the USA 
differs systematically from the rest of the media environment and show on the basis of millions (!) of 
data pieces how much more susceptible it has been to disinformation, lies, and half-truths. They argue 
that something fundamentally different is happening in right-wing media than in centrist, centre-left, 
and left-wing media. The main difference, the authors found, is, that that the media ecosystem with 
centre, centre- left, and left-wing sites are almost always committed to journalistic truth-seeking 
norms, while the right-winged media sites are not. Those norm-constraining mechanisms of high-
quality journalism then serve as a consistent check on dissemination and validation of the stories, also 
more extreme ones, when they do emerge on the left, and quickly identify fake-news and untruths, 
while this watchdog is not present on the right (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018). 
The authors go on to make the argument throughout the book that the behaviour of the right-wing 
media ecosystem represents a radicalization of roughly a third of the entire American media system. 
While an analysis of left versus right-winged changes in the public sphere is not explicitly my research 
aim, I nevertheless find it important to acknowledge this research finding as it is still inextinguishably 
interrelated with the changes in the public sphere that I will analyse in this thesis. Cambridge Analytica 
has most obviously had an effect on both, Trump’s victory as president of the United States, as well 
as the Vote Leave campaign during the Brexit referendum.  
What is of bigger interest to me for this thesis, is the authors’ analysis of network propaganda, a term 
they use to describe “the ways in which the architecture of a media ecosystem makes it more or less 
susceptible to disseminating manipulations and lies (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 24), “in 
particular with regards to the role of network architecture and information flow dynamics in 
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supporting and accelerating propagation, as opposed to resisting or correcting the propagandist 
efforts as they begin to propagate” (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 33). 
The authors postulate that new technological processes allow for the convergence of social media, 
algorithmic news curation, bots, artificial intelligence, and big data analysis which create novel 
challenges to consumers and policy makers such as the creation of echo chambers and filter bubbles 
that reinforced our biases, are removing indicia of trustworthiness, overwhelming our capacity to 
make sense of the world, and with it our capacity to govern ourselves as reasonable democratic 
citizens (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 4). 
The authors however argue that the current crisis of the US media system is more institutional than 
technological and is driven by asymmetric political polarization rather than by commercial advertising 
systems. Their major research findings suggest that the present epistemic crisis has an inescapably 
partisan shape and that each of the “usual suspects” of threats to democracies, such as Russian 
hackers, bots, market driven algorithms and so forth, acts through and depends on the asymmetric 
partisan ecosystem that has developed over the past four decades. Their analysis of the graveness of 
our current epistemic crisis brought about by social media and new technologies is therefore rather 
comforting than alarming, the authors nevertheless acknowledge several factors which are significant 
for the information disorder, post-truth era of American political communication. 
One such factor through which network propaganda operates is by so called clickbait, which are media 
items, often headlines and titles, which are designed to trigger an affective response from a user that 
leads them to click on the item, as opposed to a merely informative or fair description of the content, 
because the click itself generates revenue on social media, based on their business model. While the 
appeal to affect versus reason, especially in political decision making is not new, as I have already 
discussed in this thesis, it is surely intensified in the fast-paced age of a digital society.  
Another factor in network propaganda that has the potential to disrupt political communication is 
Facebook’s news feed which, lures us into echo chambers and filter bubble, as I will discuss in some 
more detail below. This concern more generally reflects the problem of algorithmic governance, or 
“the replacement of human, legible, and accountable judgments with “black box” algorithms” 
(Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018, p. 10).  
Within the age of network propaganda, we have also entered the age of “behavioural marketing” 
which is nothing else than microtargeted advertising. The exact system that the Cambridge Analytica 
researchers used to target voters, both in the US and Great Britain. While this form of advertising has 
been used in marketing for a while, the Cambridge Analytica exemplifies what these practices can do 
to democratic elections, and normative considerations are acutely different in this context (Benkler, 
Faris & Roberts, 2018). 
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Without going to deep into the analysis of what happened during the Cambridge Analytica 
machinations yet, what happened in this novel form of political manipulation carried out via social 
media, is that Facebook allowed campaigns to directly target voters by drawing on multiple sources 
of data that linked together Facebook accounts with email addresses, postal addresses, phone 
numbers and over thousand data points on specific American voters. Facebook then also provided the 
interface that allowed campaigns to target specific voters, their geographic regions, or demographics 
or to send ads to hyperspecific segments of the population based on this personal data. This capability 
was coupled with tools which were originally designed for commercial applications and helped to 
quickly evaluate how well different alternatives of the same message elicit engagement in the target 
audience. This form of testing supported broad-scale experimentation, removed much of the 
guesswork from advertising of previous political campaigns and allowed campaigners to know exactly 
which advertisement worked on who and when (Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 2018).  
While previous propaganda was often a guess work and a story that was sold to more of less to the 
whole population, propaganda today is targeted specifically at desired segments of a populations, and 
new testing techniques quickly tell the campaigners how well certain forms of advertisements work 
and can be adjusted accordingly. This not only promotes certain candidates and bashes others as it 
has always happened, but it directly and significantly undermines citizens sovereignty, and misuses 
their data, without consent, in opacity, and lacking the necessary and appropriate legislation to control 
this. This matter becomes especially relevant coupled with the statistics to fortify the amplification of 
this trend; digital advertising spending are increasing every year, with the highest spending being on 
Facebook and necessary legislation to avoid a spill-over effect from marketing to politics is still not in 
place. Even after scandals such as Cambridge Analytica and numerous privacy policy outrages (Pew 
Research Centre, 2019). 
 
4.4.4 Filter Bubbles 
 
Eli Pariser, an internet activist and author, coined the now famous term “filter bubbles” in his 2011 
book of the same title which describes a state of intellectual isolation that occurs because website’s 
algorithms selectively show us content based on previous information. In this book he argues that the 
digital world is fundamentally changing. Personalization through algorithms, he postulates, are driving 
us into a state of intellectual isolation, a point I want to take up for the last part of this chapter.  
Mainly focussing on the opaque algorithms of Google, Facebook and the like, Pariser argues in his 
book that there is no common standard anymore. When two people search identical terms on Google, 
they end up getting entirely different results, based on around 57 factors such as previous searches, 
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location, device type and so on. Google’s announcement in 2009 to introduce personalized searches 
for everyone, marked, according to Pariser, the turning point of an important yet nearly invisible 
revolution in the ways we consume information. And this personalization is shaping how information 
flows far beyond Facebook and is quickly moves us to a world “where the internet is showing us what 
it thinks we want to see, but not necessarily what we need to see” (Pariser, TED Talk, 2011). What 
happens in “filter bubbles” is that algorithms create a unique universe of information for each of us, 
based on precise data on how, when, where, for how long, and what we consume in the internet, 
which fundamentally alters the way we encounter ideas and information. Because of social media’s 
business model, they provide us a free service, and we pay with our information. This information is 
used for targeted, highly relevant advertising. This mechanism then, creates everyone’s own personal 
universe of information that we live in online. This universe is built upon factors I have already 
reviewed above, clickbait, sensationalism, right-winged biases and so on. And not only is our access 
to news online biased and very limited, in a personalized world, important but complex or unpleasant 
issues are also less likely to come to our attention at all (Pariser, 2011). The focus on the technical, 
algorithmic personalization online is incidentally how filter bubbles differ from echo-chambers, which 
are typically used to describe the social phenomenon of being surrounded by like-minded people with 
similar opinions. 
The dynamics this creates brings up three problems that we have never encountered before according 
to Pariser (2011), whose analysis I share: Firstly, we are alone in the filter bubbles. While there are 
certainly TV or radio channels as well as newspapers that caters to a narrow interest, they nevertheless 
have always had other viewers with whom you share a frame of reference. What is changing now with 
highly targeted advertising based on intransparent algorithms is that you are the only person in your 
bubble, nobody sees the exact same thing in the same combination that you see online. In an age 
when shared information is the bedrock of shared experience, Pariser argues, the filter bubble is like 
a centrifugal force which is pulling us apart. The second problem is that the filter bubble is invisible. 
Most viewers of conservative or liberal news sources know that they are engaging with a news outlet 
that is curated to serve a particular political viewpoint. But Google’s and Facebook’s agendas are 
opaque. Google does not share with you their assessment of who it thinks you are or why it is showing 
you the results that you are seeing. It is almost impossible to check or challenge whether or not these 
assumptions about you are right or wrong, and most people might not even be aware that there are 
assumptions being made about them in the first place. Finally, wo do not choose to enter the bubble. 
When you turn on for example Fox News or read The New York Times, you are making a conscious 
decision about what kind of filter to use to make sense of the world. This is an active process and you 
can guess how the editors’ leaning shapes your perception. We however do not get to make the same 
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kind of choice with personalized filters. They come to us and are impossible to avoid if you want to 
use the internet because of their profit driven business models. 
While people have surely never been perfectly rational and fair citizens when it comes to opposing 
views and counterintuitive information, the point is that we had a choice, a choice that is now made 
by a handful of profit-driven companies in Silicon Valley in the USA. A functioning democracy requires 
citizens to see things from one another’s point of view, but filter bubbles and echo chambers are 
making this increasingly unlikely (Pariser, 2011). The costs of this, Pariser (2011) concludes, are both 
personal and cultural. There are direct consequences for all of us, with our horizon being increasingly 
dictated by personalized filters. To be the author of our own lives, we have to be aware of the variety 
of options and lifestyles that we have; when we live in a filter bubble however, companies construct 
which options we become aware of. Furthermore, there are also societal consequences, which emerge 
when masses of people begin to live a filter-bubbled life. And these consequences are what I want to 
address in the following chapters.  
There are many things that continue from the analogue times of propaganda to the digital age: the 
monopolization of media outlets, the concentration of power, the promotion of favoured ideas, the 
bashing of political opponents and even the dissemination of lies, untruths or, as we call it nowadays, 
fake news. Many of these factors intensify in the digital age but some also open up fundamentally 
different problems for democracy. I have outlines above how algorithms create filter bubbles and echo 
chambers and allow for hyper-personalized (political) advertisement. I have explained how political 
advertisement is no longer a guessing game, but is instead targeted at a specific segment of the 
population, whose success can be constantly monitored and adjusted. The possibility of a shared 
(medial) experience is hindered or even nullified. Bots and troll armies can fundamentally change the 
perception of public opinion, and an increased monopolization has created a newer-before seen 
centralization of power. These developments enable a number of fragmented spheres in which fake 
news can flourish, extreme-right winged news gain popularity, and a division of society is the 
consequence. People – citizens – are degraded to users and consumers. 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
5. Analysis 
5.1 Cambridge Analytica – Mapping the case 
 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal unfolded in March 2018 and was published exclusively at the 
Observer/Guardian in the UK, where reporters have investigated the case, together with several 
whistleblowers, for over a year. I will now firstly explain how the scandal unfolded, and what the 
intentions and techniques behind it were. I will then move on to the analysis of how the conceptual 
framework of the public sphere works to explicate the events and risks involved in the Cambridge 
Analytica case. I will do this on the basis of the articles which can be found under the Cambridge 
Analytica files of the website of the Guardian. After having scanned all articles to get an in-depth 
understanding of the whole issue, I have selected roughly ten, especially relevant articles, with a focus 
on those which broach the issue of social media, problems with democracy, and the societal and 
political consequences of the data breach, as I found those especially relevant for the objective of my 
thesis. Besides offering a summary of what has happened, I have included several quotations from 
relevant actors, that will offer access to momentum when the case unfolded. After this, I will begin 
with the actual analysis. I will investigate how the concept helps to explain the events and risks of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, and how it relates to broader issues in democratic systems. 
Cambridge Analytica was a British data analytics firm that focused on election operations and, most 
notably became tragically famous for working with Donald Trump’s election team and the winning 
Brexit campaign. Whistleblower and Cambridge Analytica’s co-founder Christopher Wylie uncovered 
in early 2018 that the data firm illegally harvested millions of Facebook profiles of US voters through 
a personality application with extensive and sensitive Facebook data and used this information to 
build, what he called, a “psychological warfare weapon” and a “full-service propaganda machine” 
(Wylie, 2018).  
After having the idea to combine empirical psychological test results with advertisement, Cambridge 
Analytica started collaborating with Dr. Aleksandr Kogan, a researcher at Oxford University. The 
researcher developed a Facebook app which featured a personality quiz, for which Cambridge 
Analytica paid people to take it. In exchange, they would, unknowingly to the test-takers, get full 
access to the data (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018b). On this test, users were scored on the “big 
five” personality traits – Openness, Conscientiousness, Extroversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism 
– and in return they consented to give Kogan access to their Facebook profiles. The app then recorded 
the results of each quiz and collected data from the test taker’s Facebook account (Cadwalladr & 
Graham-Harrison, 2018b). This included Facebook status updates, all “likes”, check-ins, locations, and 
sometimes even private messages (Wylie, 2018). This overarching pool of information enabled the 
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team around Kogan and Cambridge Analytica to establish a database of an initial 50 million US voters 
in only two to three months (Facebook later admitted it was actually 87 million users who had their 
profiles mined (Cadwalladr, 2019). This quickly created a very new way of measuring personality traits 
across the population and correlating these scores against Facebook “likes” across millions of people 
(Cadwalladr, 2018). 
 
Source: The Guardian 
 
While Kogan did have the permission to pull the Facebook data he retrieved through the app, it for 
academic purposes only; it was however illegal for this personal data to be sold to a third party without 
consent (Cadwalladr, 2018), which is was ultimately happened. 
 
 “Millions of people’s personal information was stolen and used to target them in ways they 
 wouldn’t have seen, and couldn’t have known about, by a mercenary outfit, Cambridge 
 Analytica.” – Carole Cadwalladr, investigative journalist at the Guardian1 
 
                                                          
1 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-
faceook-nix-bannon-trump  
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This personal information was thus taken without authorisation in early 2014, not only from the 
people who actually took the test on Facebook, but it also gave access to all their Facebook friends 
highly personal information, thus quickly establishing a huge pool of information and data (Cadwalladr 
& Graham-Harrison, 2018b). All this information was then used to build a system that could profile 
individual US voters. The goal was to target voters according to their profile with highly personalised 
political advertisements. In what would become Facebook’s biggest ever data breach, this information 
was then used by data analysists at Cambridge Analytica to build a powerful software program which 
could predict and influence voting choices and preferences (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018a). 
 
 “We exploited Facebook to harvest millions of people’s profiles. And built models to exploit 
 what we knew about them and target their inner demons. That was the basis the entire 
 company was built on.” – Christopher Wylie, co-founder of C.A. and whistleblower2 
 
According to Wylie, who had emails, invoices, contracts and bank transfers to back up his claims, 
Cambridge Analytica spent 1 million US Dollars alone on the data collection for this project, which 
yielded more than 85 million original individual profiles that could then be matched to electoral rolls 
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018a; Cadwalladr, 2019), overall however, the company created 
psychological profiles of as many as 230 million Americans (Cadwalladr, 2018a). The test results, 
coupled with the illegally obtained, sensitive Facebook data was then used to build the algorithm that 
could analyse individual Facebook profiles and determine alarmingly precise personality traits linked 
to voting behaviour. The company scanned their entire database with this new algorithm, identified 
likely political attitudes and personality traits, and could then decide who to target, when and how, 
and craft their messages precisely in a way that was likely to appeal to them for those individuals – a 
political approach known as “micro-targeting” (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018b). The company 
was able to learn exactly what kind of messages people are susceptible to: including framing, topics, 
content, tone, scariness level and so on, as well as where someone is going to consume which news 
and how many times they needed to touch someone with a particular message in order to change 
how they think about something (Wylie, 2018). The algorithm and this extensive database together 
created a new powerful political tool; It allowed a campaign to identify possible swing voters and craft 
messages more likely to resonate with them and it allowed them to not waste resources on already 
                                                          
2 https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-
election  
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convinced voters, and instead target individual swing-voters precisely and successfully (Cadwalladr & 
Graham-Harrison, 2018a). 
A team of data scientists, strategists, psychologists, and designers then created the necessary content. 
A targeting team was responsible to inject this new content to the internet: They would create 
websites, blogs, and all kinds of other content on the internet that they would make sure the 
applicable targets could find and thus change their worldview in favour of, in this case Trump and 
Brexit (Wylie, 2018). At its height the company was generating 34,000 news stories a day (Cadwalladr, 
2019) and targeted individuals were bombarded with the tailored content, a technique known as 
“informational dominance” (Cadwalladr, 2018). Below is an example from an intern Cambridge 
Analytica presentation that shows how they could adjust Google search results to match the desired 
outcome, namely controlling impressions, expose certain scandals to a certain population, and drive 
traffic to relevant webpages. 
 
Source: The Guardian 
 
Wylie explains that while microtargeting has of course existed previously in politics, what he and the 
rest of the Cambridge Analytica team added to this, and what makes the case stand out, were 
combining the data with constructs from psychology which would not only target people as voters, 
but instead target people as individual personalities. What is new compared to former strategic 
communication techniques or propaganda, is that Cambridge Analytica was able to build a 
psychological profile of each individual voter in a particular region or, in this case all of the US. (Wylie, 
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2018). Thus, voters could be targeted with a high degree of certainty of what kind of message exactly 
would work for them to nudge them in a certain direction, as opposed to the more or less guesswork 
that was previously common in political advertising.  
Algorithms, some more and some less transparent or dubious, are now used by every possible website 
or online-application. The algorithm which lies at the heart of the whole Facebook breach, therefore 
of course stands for a wider complex of problems, rather than just this single instance. And the 
precision of today’s algorithms sound almost too sophisticated to be real;  Cambridge Analytica 
collected and combined the most apparently trivial Facebook postings, all the “likes” users have ever 
clicked while scrolling through their phone or browser, in order to gather sensitive personal 
information about sexual orientation, race, gender, even intelligence and childhood trauma 
(Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018b). And it worked. A few dozen Facebook “likes” can reliably 
give a strong prediction of which party a user will vote for, reveal their gender, their sexual orientation, 
their ethnicity, social class, or predict their vulnerability to substance abuse.  
 “Some results may sound more like the result of updated online sleuthing than sophisticated 
 data analysis; “liking” a political campaign page is little different from pinning a poster in a 
 window. But […] psychology researchers showed that far more complex traits could be 
 deduced from patterns invisible to a human observer scanning through profiles. Just a few 
 apparently random “likes” could form the basis for disturbingly complex character 
 assessments.” - Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, journalists at the Guardian3 
Research has reliably shown that an analysis of Facebook likes alone can be used to automatically and 
accurately predict a range of highly sensitive personal attributes such as sexual orientation, ethnicity, 
religious and political views, personality traits, intelligence, happiness, use of addictive substances, 
parental separation, age, and gender. In one analysis from 2013 for example, researchers could 
correctly discriminate users between homo- and heterosexual men, could predict their ethnicity, and 
political affiliation with an accuracy in the high 80 and 90 percentiles (Kosinski, Stillwell, & Graepel, 
2013).  
 
 
                                                          
3 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/17/facebook-cambridge-analytica-kogan-
data-algorithm  
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5.1.1 Relations to Trump 
 
Steve Bannon, who is most famous for being the former executive chairman of Breitbart news (a far-
right syndicated American news, opinion, and commentary website) and former White House chief 
strategist under Trump, is one of the names that is frequently cited in relation to the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal. He served as a board member to Cambridge Analytica and was, according to Wylie, 
the one who even named the company – Cambridge Analytica - in order to emphasize its ties with the 
University and justify the data exchange between the two entities (Wylie, 2018). Steve Bannon, Wylie 
told, was interested in the whole project because he believed in the Breitbart doctrine that “if you 
want to change politics you first have to change culture” (Wylie, 2018). Bannon explained to Wylie 
that politics flows from culture, and “if you want to change culture, you first have to understand what 
the units of culture are. People are the units of culture. So, if you want to change politics you first have 
to change people, to change culture” (Wylie, 2018). It was Bannon who introduced Wylie to the right-
winged US hedge fund billionaire Robert Mercer who later funded the whole project by investing 15 
million dollars into Cambridge Analytica.  
It is difficult to say what was the defining factor in getting Trump elected or growing the alt-right, 
Wylie said (Wylie, 2018), but it is now an established fact that Cambridge Analytica targeted 10,000 
different ads to different audiences in the months leading up to the election, and that those ads were 
seen and interacted with billions of times (Lewis & Hilder, 2018). Even though the precise impact may 
be difficult to determine, Cambridge Analytica’s operations are inextricable from Trump’s, as well as 
Vote Leave’s, victories. This becomes clear especially with regards to the very small lead in both cases; 
Trump (who in fact did not even win the popular vote) and Clinton only had a difference of 3 million 
votes in a handful of states, and Brexit was decided on the basis of 52% in favour versus 48% against 
leaving the EU. With the immense presence of both campaigns online, as illustrated above, combined 
with statistics on the use of the internet and social media as a source of news compared to the 
traditional media outlets, a significant impact of this operation on both elections is, to say it 
tentatively, very likely. This is what makes this case not only theoretically, but also practically a 
challenge to democracy and the public sphere. 
 
5.1.2 The aftermath of Cambridge Analytica and its consequences to democracy 
 
What this massive data breach shows is that “the power and dominance of the Silicon Valley – Google 
and Facebook and a small handful of others – are at the centre of the global tectonic shift we are 
currently witnessing” (Cadwalladr, 2017), and that many things that we are witnessing globally in 
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politics are intertwined. “Brexit and Trump are entwined. The Trump administration’s links to Russia 
and Britain are entwined, and Cambridge Analytica is one point of focus through which we can see all 
these relationships in play” (Cadwalladr, 2017).  
 
 “We are in the midst of a massive land grab for power by billionaires via our data. Data, 
 which is being silently amassed, harvested and stored. Whoever owns this data owns the 
 future.” – Carole Cadwalladr, investigative journalist for the Guardian4  
 
Sociologist David Miller evaluated the scandals impact on democracy and concluded that it is 
important to understand that Cambridge Analytica was not a normal political consultancy; instead it 
was the product of a billionaire spending huge amounts of money to build an experimental science 
lab, to test new manipulative methods and, to find the tiny slivers of influence that can, and did, tip 
an election (Cadwalladr, 2017).  
 
 “It should be clear to voters where information is coming from, and if it’s not transparent or 
 open where it’s coming from, it raises the question of whether we are actually living in a 
 democracy or not.” - David Miller, sociology professor at Bath University5 
 
Cambridge Analytica had to close operations in 2018 after the scandal, but the company had at least 
18 active companies, branches, and affiliates with similar names, based in the UK and the US alone 
(Siegelmann, 2018).  
Cambridge Analytica clearly stands for a bigger network and for a bigger problem. A problem I want 
to address in this thesis. It stands for novel techniques in political communication, for new forms or 
propaganda and rigged elections, it stands for a growing alt-right and an uncontrolled monopoly 
market that is playing with people’s data and privacy. It also lays bare the problematic unilateral power 
of Facebook and other data giants who are now in a position to control speech worldwide, with no 
fitting legislation to control or check it. 
                                                          
4 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-
hijacked-democracy  
5 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/07/the-great-british-brexit-robbery-
hijacked-democracy  
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 “This may be the first time in history where a company literally controlled by one person 
 appears to be unaccountable to anyone anywhere on Earth.” – Jason Kint, tech industry expert6 
 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates problems and challenges to open and democratic societies 
in many ways; ways which I will now analyse through the lens of the public sphere.  
 
5.2 Cambridge Analytica and the Public Sphere 
 
In this section I will identify five challenges to the ideals of a democratic society by analysing the events 
of the Cambridge Analytica scandal through Habermas’ theoretical framework. Through qualitative 
content analysis and I was able to describe and understand the phenomenon of Cambridge Analytica 
from my data and extract meaning from the events, in this step of the analysis I will investigate in 
more detail how the current trends of the scandal relate to the ideals of the public sphere. 
5.2.1 New methods of political manipulation 
 
While it is often claimed that there is nothing categorically novel or even particularly outstanding 
about the ways in which we are being manipulated today (see for example Benkler, Faris & Roberts, 
2018), I, on the other hand, have showed that one of the first things that we can take away from the 
illustrations of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and other literature, is that we are dealing with very 
novel forms of political manipulation. This is part of a much broader and deeper critique of behavioural 
marketing generally, in which opaque AI-driven social media advertising used for political ends, as 
done by Cambridge Analytica, is undermining consumer and citizen sovereignty. I have already 
discussed this at some lengths in the chapter on the history of political manipulation but want to 
establish this is the first insight of this scandal.  
Being (status-)free citizens and self-legislating, in other words being sovereign, is one of Habermas 
basic preconditions for a successful public sphere and hence a modern, liberal democracy. This 
condition is clearly challenged by these novel forms of manipulation as illustrated above. The lack of 
consent, the illegitimate use of data, as well as the application of micro-targeting techniques in 
political campaigning and thus its repressive character, are all undermining, or at the very least 
                                                          
6 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-year-on-lesson-in-
institutional-failure-christopher-wylie  
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questioning, the idea of sovereignty. I have showed that there is a profound change in the way that 
we are being approached as the civil society; and that is no longer as one big audience, or perhaps 
various sub-groups, or sub-spheres based on demographic information; but we are instead being 
targeted as individuals. Not only are we however targeted as individuals, a unique reality is created 
for each and every one of us that might be fundamentally different from the reality that is created for 
our neighbour, our friend, our political opponent. A shared public sphere, necessary for an open 
debate which is critical to democracy, is therefore nullified. On a similar note, the media as a free and 
active system is central to Habermas’ notion of the public sphere and constitutes one of two formal 
actors in this sphere (Habermas, 2006). Habermas already recognized problems with the mass media 
in the Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, and worried that pseudo spheres are created by 
the mass media where citizens are passive spectators instead of actively involved citizens, and where 
culture and politics are consumed rather than shaped (Habermas, 1962). This problem gains new and 
amplified urgency during this current crisis and the notion of a free, fair, and high-quality media 
system is challenged by, for example, the creation of fake content and fake spheres, as I will discuss 
in some more detail below. This is also challenging Dahlgren’s (2005) structural dimension of the public 
sphere in which media organizations are thought to present accurate, fair, and relevant information 
to the civic public. The absence of identifications of sources or financers of political campaigns for 
example, which was misused by the Cambridge Analytica team, intensifies the difficulty to distinguish 
journalism from non-journalism (Dahlgren, 2005). To summarize, the lack of transparency, the 
indistinguishability of high-quality journalistic, and fake news, as well as the highly personalized 
character of distinct public spheres create a novel challenge to Habermas’ ideal component of 
democracy. 
 “There is a persuasive case that this is a profound change to the political ecosystem with 
 considerable potential to subvert the open debate which is critical to democracy. In the 
 analogue political era, we could all read the promises a party put in its manifesto, we could all 
 see the claims a party made on its roadside billboards, and we could all watch the attacks 
 launched on an opponent in a TV broadcast. That made it possible to call out mendacities and 
 expose contradictions and to hold those responsible to account. This didn’t prevent distortion 
 and misinformation, but it was easier to spot and more risky to perpetrate. There is not the 
 capacity to apply that invigilation if millions of individualised messages are being micro-
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 targeted at voters on social media. Even less so when the propaganda is anonymised.”  
 - Andrew Rawnsley, Observer's award-winning chief political commentator7 
 
5.2.2 Amplified challenges to the ideal of deliberation  
 
An obvious and well-known challenge to the conception of the public sphere (and deliberative 
democracy) is the lack of deliberation. I bring this point up again, because I believe that the problem 
of deliberation as a means to democracy, shared understanding, and informed decision making- and 
opinion-formation processes is yet again amplified in the digital age. It is debatable whether 
Habermas’ ideal of deliberation has ever existed in the first place, as I have discussed at length in the 
theoretical chapter. In the same section, I nevertheless also established that deliberation is an 
important value and an incontestable goal in any liberal democracy. Whether it ever existed in the 
way in which Habermas idealized it is not necessarily of huge importance here. It is however relevant 
to examine whether we are approaching this ideal or whether we veer away from it. 
First of all, it is important to recognize that people need a shared reality in order to discuss and argue 
about anything of importance. We need common facts and realities as a basis for understanding one 
another. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that different people from the same country may 
always have had very different experiences and lived realities. A wealthy native European man surely 
has always lived in a different social reality than a for example a young immigrant man, a blue-collar 
worker, or a single mother. While acknowledging these discrepancies, when these people turned on 
the TV or radio, they nevertheless were able to see the same news, had access to the same statistics, 
and information, and were exposed to the same kind of advertisement or propaganda. Besides living 
very different lives, there was a shared reality for all citizens in a society. Today, these same people 
may find completely different information online, may consume fundamentally different, and 
sometimes even fake, news, and live in an even more disparately constructed reality. They would 
barely be able to agree on, for example, what the president has in fact done or has not done, which 
goals a certain political party follows or whether the country in which they live is doing well or bad. I 
want to emphasize again, that of course people were not simply living in a homogenous society before, 
nor were they easily convinced as soon as they exchanged views and discussed with one another – 
nevertheless it seems that the difference that have always existed between people are now exploited, 
                                                          
7 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/25/we-cant-control-digital-giants-with-
analogue-rules 
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capitalized and augmented. Shared facts must be the basis of every discussion and as these seize to 
exist, deliberation will become impossible. As Tufekci (2014) notes, unlike broadcast, personalized 
online messages based on opaque algorithms are “not visible to broad publics and thus cannot be 
countered, fact-checked or otherwise engaged with in the shared public sphere the way a provocative 
or false political advertisement on broadcast might have been” (Tufekci, 2014, p. 29). This form of big 
data enabled computational politics and personalized advertisement is a private one, she continues, 
and at its very core opposed to the idea of the civic space as a public, shared commons, as theorized 
in the conception of the public sphere (Tufekci, 2014). Tufekci (2014) goes on to note that “big data 
driven computational politics can undermine the civic experience [and] is the destruction of ‘status-
free’ deliberation of ideas on their own merit” (Tufekci, 2014, p. 31). She argues that, since the ideal 
of Habermas public sphere was envisioned as a public which interacts between status-free individuals 
and debates ideas based on their merits, regardless of who uttered them, the new developments 
discussed here constitute an anti-Habermasian public sphere. In the age of big data, every interaction 
happens between people who are “known quantities”, she argues, and further the public is 
constituted unequally. The campaigners know a lot about every person it is interacting with whereas 
ordinary members of the public on the other hand have no such information whatsoever. This is 
fundamentally opposed to the idea of status-free and equal citizens (Tufekci, 2014). The “beneficial 
inefficiency” known from previous political campaigning that aided the public sphere, is now removed 
by computational politics (Tufekci, 2014). 
This challenges Habermas theory at its very basis. Of course this challenge is not new, and the 
overarching aim of deliberation (rationally and emotionally based) as a highly valued principle in 
democracies still stands as it did, but with the changes that algorithms, and highly personalized 
political advertisement, coupled with fake news, bots and human trolls, that change the perception 
of the atmosphere in society (mirrored online), this becomes increasingly difficult to maintain.  
 
5.2.3 The difference of fragmentation and pluralization  
 
The more elaborated notion of the public sphere holds that the public sphere consists of various, often 
competing publics (see especially Fraser’s addition to the concept). The internet, and social media in 
particular, are often seen to have a democratic potential, especially for minorities and the subaltern 
counterpublics which Fraser described; the internet breaks down many barriers, offers a place for 
discussion and organization, access to much more (and free) information, and thus theoretically 
extends the public sphere and enables participation to political life (Dahlberg, 2007). I have however 
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also already summarized how this democratic potential is in reality undermined by the influence of 
neoliberal and market logics, the power of private capital, the unchallenged monopoly status of the 
GAFAs (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) , all private companies who control the flow of data, and 
install algorithms which determine the visibility of content and thus have enormous consequences for 
politics, and overshadowed by the demand for consumerism and entertainment online. 
What the Cambridge Analytica case illustrates is a new mode of estrangement, characterized by an 
extreme fragmentation of society. This fragmentation is categorically different than the pluralization 
of society that is surely desired and has been describes at length above, and is further much 
accentuated from what we know from the “offline” public sphere which was most strongly influenced 
by the traditional mass media (see again Dahlberg, 2007; Sunstein, 2001; Habermas, 2006).  
My description of the history of propaganda showed that today’s (online) political manipulation, 
illustrated by the Cambridge Analytica case, stands out because of its never-before-seen level of 
personalization. While propaganda before the digital age was always a shared experience (e.g. Pariser, 
2011), the highly personalized micro-targeting of today makes this impossible. 
 “Instead of standing in the public square and saying what you think, and then letting people 
 come and listen to you, and then have that shared experience of what your narrative is, you 
 are whispering into the ear of each and every voter. And you may be whispering one thing to 
 this voter and another thing to another voter. We risk fragmenting society in a way where we 
 don’t have any more shared experiences and we don’t have any more shared understanding. 
 If we don’t have any more shared understanding, then how can we be a functioning society?” 
 - Christopher Wylie, co-founder of C.A. and whistleblower8 
 
A problem that feeds into this is that of filter bubbles, which I have also discussed at length in the 
chapter on political manipulation. Pariser (2011) has pointed out that a functioning democracy 
requires citizens to see things from one another’s point of view. A democracy further requires a 
reliance on shared facts, but because of the opaque algorithms of Facebook, Google, and the like, and 
highly personalized micro-targeting as performed by Cambridge Analytica (and others) we are 
unwillingly more and more enclosed in our own bubbles. According to Pariser (2011) this brings us to 
a state where we all live in parallel but separate universes, and shared facts almost do not exist 
                                                          
8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FXdYSQ6nu-M 
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anymore. Instead, we have a set of distinct spheres – all tailored to people’s unique interests and 
personality traits. 
We can conclude from this that the pluralization of society and its public spheres, is perhaps not 
thoroughly abrogated, but strongly challenged and fragmented. The extreme personalization online, 
through inscrutable and opaque algorithms on the one hand, and highly personalized (political) 
advertisement on the other. This targeting on an individual level further introduces a new form of 
categorical inequality into the public sphere (Tufekci, 2014). 
A shared experience is in this case barely possible, and democracy is challenged by a strong 
disagreement on basic facts, but also by a standpoint from a perhaps fundamentally different public 
sphere. This is further amplified by another development that I will address soon, namely the creation 
of “fake” public spheres by bots and human troll armies.  
 
5.2.4 The misuse of affect  
 
Another important factor in the development of the public sphere, as well as the exploitation thereof, 
is, as I have discussed in detail in the theoretical chapter, affect – as a valid and integral part of political 
participation. Zizi Papacharissi is the most prominent scholar in this field and added this important 
notion to the concept of the public sphere. Following her arguments, it is important to not only 
acknowledge affect as a valid driver of political participation, but also to take away a more critical 
understanding of the high aspirations if rationality, that are quite common in the political sphere. 
Papacharissi postulates that responses to political developments are a mix of emotion with fact-
informed opinion, rather than mere logic, and that often only emotionally driven aspirations challenge 
the hegemony and the status quo. Affect, and everything that comes with it, can disrupt the power of 
hierarchies and therefore constitutes an important political tool. Surely, social media online can be 
one outlet for such emotions and can and have aided political activism and revolutions (think of for 
example the Arab Spring or the Occupy movement) (Papacharissi, 2015). 
The potential the internet has in this respect is incontrovertible. But besides the drawbacks and 
realities that have already been described in this paper, the Cambridge Analytica scandal unveils yet 
other and worrisome realities about this contingency. With the academic as well as popular interest 
in psychology and its impact on everyday life we are able to understand affect and emotions better 
and better, and it is no surprise that Papacharissi’s study of these concepts has found such strong 
support among academics and political scholars. It seems that psychology can offer a lot of what has 
been missing to aid the understanding of what is relevant for political life. Interestingly enough the 
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whole idea Cambridge Analytica was based on was in essence psychology: Aleksandr Kogan was a 
professor of psychology, the idea for the app as well as the strategic combination of the results of the 
test with other psychometric factors derived from Facebook was, again, based on promising new 
research in psychology, and Christopher Wylie, a young data scientist highly interested in psychology, 
connected the dots and built the “psychological warfare weapon” we all know now. Psychology was 
the key in the whole scandal and to be more precise; the exploitation of emotions and affect. Through 
their algorithms, Wylie and his team were able to target individual’s “inner demons” as he called it, 
and this was possible by micro-targeting the individual psychological profiles that Cambridge Analytica 
has built of several million voters. 
  “We would know what kinds of messaging you would be susceptible to – including the 
 framing of it, the topics, the contents, the tone, whether it is scary or not, that kind of thing. 
 So, what would you be susceptible to and where you are going to consume that. And then 
 how many times do we need to touch you with that in order to change how you think about 
 something.” – Christopher Wylie, co-founder of C.A. and whistleblower9 
 
In other words, the Cambridge Analytica team around Christopher Wylie studied and learned how to 
exploit emotions in order to manipulate the potential votes of millions of people. Coupled with 
personality measures, they used highly emotional appeals that they know would work on their targets. 
This can also be nicely seen in Picture 2, which shows which kind of advertisement would be shown to 
targeted individuals based on their psychological profiles. The headlines address highly sensitive topics 
and clearly position Clinton as the bad, and Trump as the good choice in the 2015 presidential 
elections. This alone is of course nothing new in political advertisement or propaganda. The difference 
again lies in the accuracy and nescience of the targeted individuals.  
While people who watch FOX-News are more or less aware through which kind of filter they view the 
world, Cambridge Analytica’s manipulation techniques targeted individuals based on their very 
personal fears, hopes, angers, and worries. They created and delivered content that would respond 
to exactly those emotions, thus completely ruling out the rationality factor instead of combining them 
as theorized by Papacharissi. Affect is and should be an important factor in political participation, and 
to remind people of scary things that may make them fearful is in itself also not a reprehensible or 
novel communication tool – think for example of the very ample climate change debate which is 
currently headlining newspapers and news shows all over the world, and where fear is a frequently 
                                                          
9 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FXdYSQ6nu-M 
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used tool to get people’s attention and participation. As already discussed, the personalization and 
the absence of a status quo and shared set of experience is the root of this problematic exploitation. 
Cambridge Analytica studied, analysed, categorized, and exploited people’s very personal emotions, 
working especially with fear as is common among right-winged populists across the world (see for 
example Wodak, 2015).  
 
5.2.5 Fake spheres  
A last way in which the digital age fundamentally challenges the public sphere is through the creation 
of fake ones. The Cambridge Analytica scandal again nicely illustrates this. Both whistleblowers 
Brittany Kaiser and Christopher Wylie, explained in-depth how the perception of a politician can be 
strongly impacted by what kind of information the algorithms allow the users to see. Further, the 
business model of social media platforms favours, and promotes sensationalist content, thus again 
amplifying the issue. 
 “Our bodies are programmed to consume fat and sugars because they’re rare in nature. […] In 
 the same way, we’re biologically programmed to be attentive to things that stimulate: content 
 that is gross, violent, or sexual and that gossip which is humiliating, embarrassing, or offensive. 
 If we’re not careful, we’re going to develop the psychological equivalent of obesity. We’ll find 
 ourselves consuming content that is least beneficial for ourselves or society as a whole.” 
  - danah boyd, technology and social media scholar10 
 
The perception of a public zeitgeist is further manipulated through the massive application of bots, 
who leave fake traces in form of comments or shared content. As I have elaborated above, bots learn 
from and imitate legitimate social media users in order to manipulate public opinion online. This is an, 
often successful attempt to manipulate. Bots work to amplify or suppress certain political messages, 
and because they are extremely cheap and easy to install all over the internet, their presence, and 
thus impact, is enormous. As I have laid out above, bots and human troll armies are used to 
manufacture consensus or otherwise give the illusion of general support for a, maybe controversial, 
political idea, policy or candidate. The aim here is to evoke political support where this might not have 
previously happened by giving the illusion of a widespread civic endorsement.  
Given that bots generate about half of all of the internet’s traffic, that over one third of Twitter’s users 
are bots, and that around 83 million Facebook-accounts are fake (Woolley & Howard, 2018), it is easy 
                                                          
10 http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/Web2Expo.html 
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to see how this can artificially shape and distort public life. Newer forms of bots can even gather 
information on other users in order to push a particular and personalized argument or agenda, and 
the Cambridge Analytica breach has shown how this method is also applied by political campaigners 
themselves. Similarly, the creation of content and the infiltration of the net with this, as admittedly 
done by the Cambridge Analytica team that worked on the Trump campaign, is feeding into the same 
vein; it creates a new version of reality, a reality that does not necessarily correspond to any version 
of the truth. And not only can it be accessed online, it is directly “pushed onto” the people who will 
be most susceptible to it. All this leads not only to the decay of a public sphere, but to the creation of 
fake ones, a distinction that is very difficult or even impossible to make for the average internet users. 
In this way, propaganda in the digital age leads to different spheres of facts and impedes a shared 
reality. It fragments the public, and it disintegrates a true civic, publicly shared, publicly accessible, 
public sphere. It is here where democracy is threatened. To quote Edward Snowden, the perhaps most 
infamous whistleblower of our times, “If we cannot agree on what is happening, how can we have a 
conversation about what it is that we should do about it?” (Snowden, 2019). 
 
6. Conclusion & Discussion 
 
In this thesis I have tried to demonstrate several relevant points when talking about the contemporary 
tendencies in political communication and manipulation evidenced by the case of Cambridge 
Analytica, in relation to the theoretical conceptualization of the public sphere. For one, I illustrated 
novel forms of political manipulation. While recognizing ongoing and intensified patterns and 
techniques of propaganda before the digital revolution, I also described what is different about 
propaganda in the digital age. Many problems from the analogue area remain or amplify; for example, 
the monopoly or oligopoly status of media houses (and now the digital data firms in Silicon Valley), 
which was already criticized in the 80s and has since then constantly intensified. Also, the problem of 
propaganda and lobby work remains and perhaps intensifies; How much influence do private 
companies have (and should have) on state politics? How much money should we allow in political 
campaigning? And so forth. Propaganda models in the analogue age have surely not (always) allowed 
for a critical and fair representation of reality via the media, as many scholars such as Hermann and 
Chomsky criticized adequately, but it did communicate a more or less unified propagandistic picture.  
With the novel opportunities of the internet, new data technologies provide significantly more 
individualized profiling and modelling, much greater data depth, which can be collected in an invisible, 
latent manner and delivered individually. These techniques lead to filter bubbles, echo chambers, and 
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a post-truth sphere in which truth is either not relevant or not clearly distinguishable. Coupled with 
an extreme monopolization and privatization of the web at large and social media platforms in 
particular, I have argued that these developments have fragmented public spheres and divide 
societies in a not-before seen dimension.  
 
6.1 Conclusion  
 
The Cambridge Analytica scandal has served as an expedient illustration of these developments. In my 
analysis I have shown that Cambridge Analytica was not a normal political consultancy, but instead 
the product of billionaires spending huge amounts of money to build an experimental science lab, in 
order to test new manipulative methods, to divide society, and rig elections in the digital age. 
Cambridge Analytica stands for novel techniques in political communication, for new forms or 
propaganda and rigged elections, it stands for a growing alt-right and an uncontrolled monopoly 
market in digital communication that is playing with people’s data and privacy. 
With regards to the public sphere I believe that my analysis has unveiled that both, the theoretical 
conception, as well as the ways political communication are undermining citizen sovereignty, are 
facing an intense crisis. Cambridge Analytica’s case constitutes an illustrative example to depict a shift 
in citizens’ roles, responsibilities, and accountability in democracy, evaluated against the concept of 
the public sphere. Through my analysis I have identified five unique challenges to the concept; Firstly, 
I have explored he novel character of political manipulation that is calling into question the validity of 
our democratic basic liberties such as a right to (truthful) information and elections. In a next step, I 
have broached the issue of deliberation in the digital age and especially on social media platforms that 
is again challenged if there is no shared reality as a basis for discussion and deliberation. Furthermore, 
I analysed the abolition of Habermas prerequisite or status-free citizens due to the mass data that is 
available and increasing the vertical hierarchy between normal citizens and big tech companies who 
own their data. My analysis also highlighted how the realm of political communication within the 
public sphere is highly fragmented, based on the extreme level of personalization and targeting online. 
In a fourth step I analysed how emotions are exploited and targeted in ill will. Lastly, I analysed how 
public spheres are challenged by the creation and popularity by a post-truth paradigm, enabled and 
fed by fake news and an attack on the free press by the labelling of them as such. 
All in all, we can derive from this analysis that the ideals of the original conceptualization of the public 
sphere are strongly challenged. It is becoming poriferous through the intense shift to the private that 
is enabled through this form by big data computational politics. This shift of political matters to the 
private sphere, to an irrational and exploitive culture online, is at its core opposed to the very idea of 
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a civic space as a public, shared commons. Habermas has showed throughout his life-project that a 
shared public sphere, sovereignty and a free-will formation through open debate are necessary ideals 
within any democracy. My analysis was able to show that these ideals are seriously threatened within 
the public sphere of the digital age. The lack of transparency, the indistinguishability of high-quality 
journalistic from fake news, as well as the highly personalized character of distinct public spheres, 
create a novel challenge to Habermas’ ideal component of democracy. The disappearance of a shared 
reality induced by the intense personalization online, as well as the lack of a high and common 
standard for truth and transparency, were identified in this thesis as the core problem of the digital 
age, which has started to induce a decay of the public sphere(s) as theorized by Habermas and others. 
My investigation of the case of Cambridge Analytica has also shown how human, legible, and 
accountable judgments are replaced with “black box” algorithms. This assaults and challenges the idea 
of citizen sovereignty in the public sphere. As a consequence, their freedom and self-legislation are 
strongly affected and limited. A lot of democratic potential is taken away from citizens by letting 
private companies arbitrate truth and control a significant amount of information, by letting them set 
the agenda for free speech, and thus essentially let them control public life. 
 
6.2 Consequences for real-life democracies 
 
What has been important to me in this thesis is not only an emphasis on timely theories, but also a 
focus on our empirical reality and the real-life consequences that challenges in the public sphere in 
the digital age bring about. The threats I have identified in light of the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
are not only conceptual, but they are severely consequential to our real-life practices, already have, 
and likely will further, materialize in the form of real problems in our political organization. Cambridge 
Analytica’s Facebook ads were possibly the deciding factor for both, the 2016 US elections, and the 
success of the Brexit referendum. Both election outcomes were extremely tight, and its propaganda 
efforts before that enormous. In the case of the US elections, the magnitude of Cambridge Analytica’s 
propaganda efforts become especially salient: With a population of around 330 million people in the 
United States, there were about 225 million citizens who were eligible to vote in 2016 of which 157 
million were registered and 137 million actually voted in the presidential elections (United States 
Census Bureau, 2017). With a difference of not even 3 million votes in the popular vote, and, as we 
now know, over 87 million targeted US voters by Cambridge Analytica, it is, at the very least, quite 
possible that these propaganda efforts had a measurable, perhaps even decisive fact on the outcome 
of the elections in 2016.  
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With or without the ready empirical evidence of measurable effects in recent elections, Facebook 
continues to play an obscure role in enabling other countries propaganda efforts; In Brazil’s 2018 
elections, it was reported that supporters of the far-right candidate had funded mass messaging 
attacks against leftist rival on WhatsApp, the messaging service Facebook bought in 2014 (Spring & 
Brito, 2018). In Brazil, Whatsapp fills the role that is often filled by social networks in other countries, 
because many mobile phone networks offer unlimited WhatsApp access to subscribers, so even 
people can use Whatsapp even without a regular internet plan (Magenta, Gragnani & Souza, 2018). 
To highlight the outsized political role of WhatsApp in Brazil; the communication platform has more 
than 120 million users in a country with a population of almost 210 million (Spring & Brito, 2018). The 
scale of, and powerlessness against, such propaganda efforts is, again, unprecedented. And it is again 
Facebook, the uncontested monopoly when it comes to social media and communication in the 
Western world, who uncritically allows accounts to send bulk messages, who enables misleading 
propaganda, and who is, seemingly, unstoppable.  
Another example is the genocide in Myanmar, where Myanmar military personnel turned Facebook 
into a tool for ethnic cleansing (Mozur, 2018). The military reportedly launched a systematic campaign 
on the social network that has been going on for several years and that targeted the country’s mostly 
Muslim Rohingya minority group (Mozur, 2018). The military exploited Facebook’s popularity and 
reach in Myanmar, “where it is so broadly used that many of the country’s 18 million internet users 
confuse the Silicon Valley social media platform with the internet” (Mozur, 2018). Hundreds of military 
personnel created troll accounts, news, and celebrity pages on Facebook to then flood them with 
incendiary comments and posts with their hatred against the Muslim minority group. Human rights 
organizations blame this propaganda campaign for inciting murders, rapes and the largest forced 
human migration in recent history (Mozur, 2018). The troubles addressed in this thesis are not only 
theoretical assumptions, but real obstacles to democracies and citizen sovereignty today. These 
further incidences again show the importance to understand the anatomy of the digital landscape and 
the way that manipulation and political communication in the digital age work. The role of sociological 
research is especially relevant in this area, as it holds the potential to continue in the tradition of 
disentangling and trying to understand the highly complex story of the interplay of politics, civil society 
and the media in the digital age. 
 
 
 
61 
 
6.3 Critical reflections in a democratic context 
 
My thesis has laid bare the problematic unilateral power of Facebook and other data giants who are 
now in a position to control speech worldwide, with no fitting legislation to control or check it. The 
novelty of my work lies in the explication of the connections of a recent and representative case of 
manipulation in the digital age and the functioning of democracy in the light of public sphere concept. 
My thesis adds to the field on a theoretical level by ways of conceptual theory-building about the 
political and civic consequences of big data. At the same time, this thesis is part of a much broader 
and deeper critique of behavioural marketing generally, in which opaque AI- driven social media 
advertising used for political ends, as done by Cambridge Analytica, is undermining consumer and 
citizen sovereignty. I therefore continue in the tradition of critical theory. 
In this thesis, I have brought forward that Facebook’s power has been unprecedented. Mark 
Zuckerberg himself has said that “In a lot of ways Facebook is more like a government than a 
traditional company” and I find this analogy very fitting. Facebook is more than just a very successful 
company and Mark Zuckerberg has more power than a very successful Silicon Valley CEO - Facebook 
is so powerful that it is, indeed, like a sovereign state (Farrell, Levi & O'Reilly, 2018). Facebook’s 
community consists of more than 2 billion people around the world, Facebook’s code established 
critical rules by which billion of people and businesses interact online (Farrell, Levi & O'Reilly, 2018), 
it’s launching its own currency - Libra -, Facebook’s algorithmic nudges are editorial choices which 
control, or at the very least organize, the flow of information on the world’s biggest social network. 
And even the legislation that is supposed to regulate the social network ultimately allow them to 
privately and transparently control yet another aspect of social life – the German Network 
Enforcement Act for example, a law aimed to combat fake news and hate speech in social networks, 
obligates social networks to remove illegal content within 24 hours from their network. To deem what 
is illegal, what is right what is wrong, what is opinion and what is sedition, however, ultimately lies in 
the hands of a private company. Facebook’s ability to install their own fact checking mechanism, gives 
them sovereignty over the domain of truth. Facebook’s choices are opaque and intransparent, but 
surely not random. And not a single person in history had as much power over a quarter of the world’s 
population as Mark Zuckerberg does. Yet he is completely unaccountable and his company, his 
(business) choices, and his unchecked control is utterly undemocratic.  
This global data monopoly project can only work and flourish under certain social and economic 
conditions. I am therefore trying to embed my findings of this thesis, the categorically different forms 
of political manipulation we face today, the architecture of the internet and social media platforms 
and its relation to the concept of the public sphere, into the bigger framework of democracy at large. 
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The democracy in which we live, as opposed to theoretical conceptions of it, can however not be 
understood without also analysing and understanding the circumstances under which it exists – and 
in the Western world, the focus of my analysis – this is a flourishing and intensified version of a 1980s 
neoliberal capitalist order. It is a novel form of a digital, surveillance capitalism, that enables the 
developments I have described in this thesis, and which challenge normative democratic ideals.  
 
6.4 Big data and neoliberal capitalism 
 
In a democracy we hold certain values high – the freedom of speech and of the press, citizen 
sovereignty, free and secret elections - yet these values not seldomly fall short. Capitalism and 
democracy have been difficult to compromise all along (Merkel, 2014). This is because the two 
ideologies follow fundamentally different logics: “unequally distributed property rights on the one 
hand, equal civic and political rights on the other; profit-oriented trade within capitalism in contrast 
to the search for the common good within democracy; debate, compromise and majority decision-
making within democratic politics versus hierarchical decision-making by managers and capital 
owners” (Merkel, 2014, Abstract). The German political scholar Wolfgang Merkel concludes that 
capitalism is not democratic, and democracy is not capitalist (Merkel, 2014). Deregulated and 
globalized markets, Merkel argues, have seriously inhibited the ability of democratic governments to 
govern. And if democratic and economic reforms do not adequately address these challenges, 
democracy will slowly transform into an oligarchy, formally legitimized by general elections – a trend 
I have shown and analysed in this thesis.  
Capitalism is the hegemonic system which enables the oligarchic structures of the powerful tech 
companies of Silicon Valley and China, but at the same time, capitalism is transformed by big data too. 
With her work on surveillance capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff (2018) has evoked a new debate, and made 
the necessary connections, between the relation of big data and neoliberal capitalism. Zuboff too, 
sees surveillance capitalism as a force that is as profoundly undemocratic as it is exploitative yet 
remains poorly understood. It is therefore through this framework of capitalism, that allows, enables, 
and amplifies, this crisis of the public sphere and democracy. Surveillance capitalism claims human 
experience as free raw material for translation into behavioural data. It works by providing free 
services that billions of people use, which then enables the providers of those services to monitor the 
behaviour of its users in astonishing detail, often without explicit consent. Some of this data is indeed 
used for service improvement, but the main goal of companies today is, according to Zuboff, to create 
and own a proprietary behavioural surplus, which fabricates into prediction products that anticipate 
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what you will do, desire, and buy now, soon, and later. Finally, these prediction products are traded 
in a new kind of marketplace that Zuboff calls behavioural futures markets. Surveillance capitalists 
have grown immensely wealthy from these trading operations, for many companies are willing to lay 
bets on our future behaviour (Zuboff, 2018). 
With this work, Zuboff makes us understand that we are not dealing merely with algorithmic 
inscrutability, but we are in fact confronted with the latest phase in capitalism’s long evolution – from 
the making of products, to mass production, to managerial capitalism, to services, to financial 
capitalism, and now to the exploitation of behavioural predictions covertly derived from the 
surveillance of users (Naughton, 2019). Much of the debate around Google, Facebook and the like, for 
example, has been framed in terms of privacy – as an issue of control over information about the self 
–  (Bridle, 2019) and while many of these arguments are viable, they also mostly loose the bigger 
framework, which is what Zuboff’s work provides. Surveillance capitalism not only represents 
amplified form of exploitation and exceptionalism that is inherent in the nature of capitalist structures, 
but it instead it seeks to shape, direct and control our inner lives. This dread force is not merely a 
higher expression of capitalism, but a perversion of it (Bridle, 2019), and it is strongly linked to the role 
ascribed to citizens, which was the main focus of this thesis. 
This line of arguments ties nicely to Byung-Chul Han, an essential modern-times German-Korean 
philosopher, whose work is the last I would like to bring into this thesis. Han (2017) discusses the 
mechanisms of big data as power structures in neoliberalist societies. In his 2017 work Psychopolitics: 
Neoliberalism and New Technologies of Power, he depicts how big data allow for a detailed analysis 
of the psychological unconscious and how this enables a complete exploitation and control of desires 
and the human psyche itself. Han calls this state, very similar to Zuboff, a digital control-society and 
sees in it the problematic mechanisms of neoliberalism in which not labour, but the mind is exploited, 
and in which citizens voluntarily share and refine all possible data about themselves. This, Han argues, 
allows for this precise mapping of the mind. By means of deploying big data, neoliberalism has tapped 
into the psychic realm and exploited it, with the result that, as Han colourfully puts it, individuals being 
degraded into the genital organs of capital. The message is that big data knows us better than we 
know ourselves (Han, 2017). 
In elections this means that governments have a 360-degree angle on its voters. That these new forms 
of available data can and do lead to micro-targeted political advertisement has been shown by the 
example of Cambridge Analytica. According to Han this leads to a “data driven psychopolitics”, which 
not only transforms our psyche and inner life, but transforms humans themselves self to a mere 
commodity. As a consequence of this, we are incapable, Han postulates, of conceiving politics as a 
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communal activity because we have become so habituated to being consumers rather than citizens. 
Politicians then too, treat us as consumers to whom they must deliver; and the consequence is that 
we grumble about politics the same way consumers do about a disappointing product or service.  
While targeted political information becomes more and more like advertisement, and micro targeting 
a common political practice, this practice increasingly merges voting and consuming - it blurs and 
finally dissolves the lines of politics and consumption. This argument was already brought forward by 
Habermas in 1962 and has been discussed in this thesis. Han adds to Habermas’ worry of the culture-
consuming citizen the exploitation of the psyche and can therefore be understood as an extension of 
his thesis. Now, Han argues, people are treated and traded as packages of data for economic and 
political use. That is, human beings have become a commodity (Han, 2017). 
When this logic of invisible coercion and exploitation, that both Zuboff and Han explain very 
expediently, is applied to the social sphere, its implications become extremely worrisome. The 
potential that human behaviour can be perfectly modelled, predicted and controlled consequentially 
eradicates the relations between individuals and trust in institutions, and the substitution of 
algorithmic certainty for any possibility of participatory, democratic society (Bridle, 2019). When 
people become commodities rather than citizens, then neoliberal capitalism has won at the cost of 
democracy. 
Digital capitalism transforms our inner lives, society – including the sphere of political communication  
– and consequentially also democracy. The topic of big data, fake news, propaganda, democracy – and 
its tensions with capitalism – are extensive. I am aware that I have tackled a complex and complicated 
field of sociological inquiry and I hope that I have been able to shed some light on the relation and 
importance of these topics. In this thesis I focused on some of the key-challenges imposed on the 
conceptualization of the public sphere by relating its theories to contemporary tendencies in political 
communication. In a further step, perhaps for my PhD, I would like to analyze the capitalist structures 
which enable and afford these challenges to a highly normative and desirable framework in a more 
in-depth manner. 
What is most urgently needed, in my evaluation, is a paradigmatic shift of rethinking, that allows us 
to not only understand the scheming of Facebook, Google, and Amazon as algorithmic opacities, or 
merely matters of privacy, but rather acknowledge them as issues of data and citizen sovereignty. We 
need to overcome our analogue mindset in order to understand highly digital and complex issues in 
the age of big data. One consequence must be a suitable legislation, that can grasp and control the 
unilateral power of the digital tech firms and restrict their unprecedented power. In a next, more 
critical step, we need to collectively question the suitability of a neoliberal governing framework in 
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times where democracy is as fragile as it is – this postulation is surely very demanding, perhaps even 
idealistic, but in my view nevertheless necessary.  
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